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Imagine taking your child' to the hospital for intensive brain sur-
gery and doctors telling you that his post-operative care will take
place in another state. Or imagine your child being turned away from
an emergency room that could heal her, but won't, because she is "too
sick" and therefore not as profitable to treat. What if your child could
no longer receive her cancer treatment because she turned eighteen?
Many North Carolina families, who have children with mental illness,
face this kind of reality.
Over the past decade, North Carolina largely privatized its mental
health system. 2 One particular type of private provider, psychiatric
residential treatment facilities (PRTFs), increasingly dominates inpa-
tient mental health services for children.' However, the North Caro-
* @ 2013 Matthew Herr. The author would like to send a big "thank you" to Iris Green,
Lisa Nesbitt, Amy Flanary-Smith, and Kathleen Herr for their support, feedback, and resource-
fulness; to the individuals who generously agreed to be interviewed for this paper; and to the
editors and staff of the NCCU Law Review, with whom it has been a pleasure to work.
1. For the purposes of this paper, "child" means someone who is less than eighteen years
old. Eighteen to twenty-one year olds will be referred to categorically. Because certain issues
apply to both children and eighteen to twenty-one year olds, "youth" means someone who is
under the age of twenty-one, including children. "Adult" means someone who is over twenty-
one years old, unless noted to the contrary.
2. See An Act to Phase In Implementation of Mental Health Reform at the State and
Local Level, §1.15, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2232, 2256(requiring area authorities to contract out the
provision of services); infra note 3; See also NAT'L INsr. FORl HEALTH CARE MGMT CHILDREN'S
MENTAl HEALril: AN OVERVIEW ANiD KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR HEALTH SYSTEM STAKE-
HloiLDEis 7 (2005). ("[A]s services increasingly are privatized through Medicaid managed care
arrangements, the role of public mental health agencies has been diminished.")
3. See generally Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facilities for Children Under the Age
of 21, N.C. Div. of Med. Assistance Enhanced Mental Health & Substance Abuse Serv., Clinical
Coverage Policy No.: 8D-1 (August 1, 2012) [hereinafter Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-1],
available at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dmalmp/8D1.pdf. The main exception being acute psychiatric
hospitals, the most intense and restrictive kind of psychiatric treatment possible. See 10A N.C.
ADMIN. CoDiE 27G.6001 (providing that psychiatric hospitals are "the most intensive and restric-
tive type of facility for individuals" receiving mental health services). Those are still run by the
state. Whitaker School is the only state-run PRTF in North Carolina, although the state runs one
other similar program called Wright School. See NC State Operated Facilities, NC DHHS (last
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lina Administrative Code only allows PRTFs, and similar facilities, to
serve youth up to age eighteen.' Yet, the Early and Periodic Screen-
ing, Diagnosis & Treatment (EPSDT) provision of Medicaid makes
the child-adult delineation at age twenty-one.' Broadening the states'
duty to provide services, EPSDT expressly requires that all EPSDT
qualified children under the age of twenty-one receive any and all ser-
vices medical professionals deem necessary.6 However, because many
of North Carolina's mental health regulations treat eighteen year olds
as adults-and "adults"' in North Carolina generally suffer from a
stark lack of meaningful mental health services'-the laws in North
Carolina create a bar to Medicaid-eligible eighteen to twenty-one year
olds from seeking vital EPSDT services within the state.' As for chil-
dren under the age of eighteen, North Carolina licenses facilities to
address either mental health issues or intellectual disability issues, but
not both.'o As a result, complex/hard-to-serve childrenn-less profita-
ble to treat children-often find themselves without appropriate in-
state treatment options.' 2
updated Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dsohf/facilitycontacts.htm. The state's remaining
PRTFs-upwards of forty at any given time-are all operated by private providers. See Licensed
by the state of North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services-Division of Health
Service Regulation, NC DHHS (last updatedNov. 2013), http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dhsr/datalmhl-
list.pdf.
4. 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 27G.0103(10) (2012); see also 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE
27G.0103(9) (2012) ("'Child' means a minor from birth through 12 years of age."); 10A N.C.
ADMIN. CODE 27G.0103(3) (2012) ("'Adolescent' means a minor from 13 through 17 years of
age."); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 27G.0103(4) (2012) ("'Adult' means a person 18 years of age or
older .... ).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)A (2006).
6. See, e.g., Assistance Enhanced Mental Health & Substance Abuse Serv., N.C. Div. of
Med., Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8B, at 2 (Nov. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Clinical Coverage Policy
No.: 8B], available at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dma/mp/8B.pdf ("IMPORTANT NOTE: EPSDT
allows a recipient less than [twenty-one] years of age to receive services in excess of the limita-
tions or restrictions below and without meeting the specific criteria in this section when such
services are medically necessary health care services to correct or ameliorate a defect, physical or
mental illness, or a [health related] condition.") (emphasis in original omitted).
7. In this context, someone over the age of eighteen.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra notes 63-69.
10. See Disability Rights NC, Kids Caught in a Double Bind: North Carolina's Failure to
Care for Children with Dual Disabilities 3 (2011) [hereinafter Kins CAUGHT IN A DOUBILF
BIND("The State separates services between Mental Health (MH) and Developmental Disabili-
ties (DD), and the process for getting services for an individual with complex needs is confusing
and difficult. Sometimes the services do not exist at all [in-state]."); see generally N.C. Div. of
Med. Assistance Enhanced Mental Health & Substance Abuse Serv., Clinical Coverage Policies
§§ 8A-8D-2, available at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dma/mp/ (for mental/behavior health desig-
nated providers); cf N.C. Div. of Med. Assistance Enhanced Mental Health & Substance Abuse
Serv., Clinical Coverage Policy 8E [hereinafter Clinical Coverage Policy 8E], available at http://
www.ncdhhs.gov/dma/mp/ (for intellectual and developmental disability designated providers).
11. For instance, children with dual-diagnoses or who are sexually reactive.
12. See infra note 76.
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In practice, this leaves North Carolina's eighteen to twenty-one
year olds and complex/hard-to-serve children who have severe mental
illness with three options: First, they can try to seek in-state inpatient
treatment in acute psychiatric hospitals, which may be inappropriately
restrictive and therefore against the law." Second, they can go with-
out essential services until they are sick enough to warrant acute psy-
chiatric hospitalization-where, once stabilized and discharged, they
are back to square-one. Or, as often is the case, they are forced to
obtain treatment out of state-often as far away as Florida or Texas-
isolating them from their families,' 4 excluding them from their com-
munities, and frequently resulting in the state of North Carolina hav-
ing little-to-no meaningful oversight over their care.15
As such, this Article argues three main points. First, under EPSDT,
the state has an affirmative duty to ensure that meaningful, compre-
hensive, and appropriate in-state psychiatric and disability services ex-
ist for all qualifying youth under the age of twenty-one.' 6 Second,
relying on other states to provide North Carolina's youth with essen-
tial EPSDT services, which the state is capable of providing itself, vio-
lates Medicaid's comparability provisions and out-of-state placement
requirements as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).' 7
Finally, the state has an obligation to ensure that the realities of its
mental health system do not belie its policies; while North Carolina
may boldly proclaim on paper that out-of-state placement is always a
13. See Olmstead v. L. C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 592, 599-600 (1999).
14. Cf N.C. DEP'Tr OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION PRolo-
COL FOR CIUENT SPECIFIC, TIMi LIMITEtD Our-o-STATF ENROLLMENT FOR RESIDENTIAL SER-
VICEs 3 (Apr. 2002) [hereinafter N.C. COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION PRiOTOCOL], available at http:/
/www.ncdhhs.gov/mhddsas/statspublications/Policy/policy-cflOloutofst.pdf (Proclaiming that
"support and continuity of family involvement is the first priority"); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE
27G §§ .1303(b)(61), .1706(b), .1805(b), .1903(e) (2012) (emphasizing the need for family in-
volvement at all levels of inpatient placement; Susan Stefan, Accommodating Families: Using the
Americans with Disabilities Act to Keep Families Together, ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 135 (emphasizing the need to keep families intact in order to have better outcomes).
15. See infra Part I.D.2.
16. Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8B, supra note 6, at 2 ("IMPORTANT NOTE:PSDT al-
lows a recipient less than [twenty-one] years of age to receive services in excess of the limitations
or restrictions below and without meeting the specific criteria in this section when such services
are medically necessary health care services to correct or ameliorate a defect, physical or mental
illness, or a [health related] condition." (emphasis in original omitted)). N.C. DEP'T OF HEALTII
AND HUMAN SieRvs., EPSDT POLICY INSTRUCIIONS UPDATE (Jan. 11, 2010) [hereinafter N.C.
EPSDT POLICY INsRucrIONs], available at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dmalepsdt/epsdtpolicyin-
structions.pdf ("Under EPSDT, North Carolina Medicaid must make available a variety of indi-
vidual and group providers qualified and willing to provide EPSDT services.").
17. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(July 26, 1990), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§12101-12213 (2009); Olmstead, 527 U.S. at
592, 599-600 (1999) (interpreting the ADA as requiring that psychiatric treatment be conducted
in the least restrictive environment possible and have the aim of reintegrating patients back into
their communities); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (2006); see also 42 C.F.R. § 431.52(b)
(2012).
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measure of last resort, in reality it is the de facto treatment plan for
many North Carolina youth." The status-quo is not tenable. Not only
does it put the state at risk of litigation," it harms North Carolina's
youth who have severe mental illness, it harms their families, and it
harms the state as a whole.
This Article follows in three parts. Part I provides an overview of
the state's mental health reform effort and the creation of privatized
PRTFs for children's mental health services. Part II outlines and ana-
lyzes the legal issues and inconsistencies in North Carolina's mental
health system for youth. Finally, Part III suggests several reforms that
North Carolina should implement, including the adoption of an evi-
dence-based approach to treatment, which has been proven to work in
other states.
I. NORTH CAROLINA'S FAILED MENTAL HEALTH REFORM EFFORT
A. The Origins of Mental Health Reform
As recently as the 1970s, people with mental illness and develop-
mental disabilities regularly were warehoused in large, state-run insti-
tutions that looked more like prisons than places to receive treatment.
People were restrained forcibly for long periods of time, while others
wallowed in their own filth.2 0 These institutions were not just places
for the violent and criminally insane; they were places where children
and adults with conditions such as autism, Down syndrome, cerebral
palsy, and epilepsy were segregated from society.2 1
Thanks to the work of advocacy groups and the intrepid investiga-
tive reporting of journalists like Geraldo Rivera, this injustice finally
came to light.2 2 In the decades that followed, people with disabilities
and their advocates fought hard to obtain appropriate, deinstitutional-
18. See N.C. COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION PROTOCOL supra note 14, at 3 (Proclaiming that
"all appropriate in-state [treatment] options [must be] exhausted prior to requesting out-of-state
placement[ ]," for any of North Carolina's children with mental illness and that "[i]n-state place-
ment for the support and continuity of family involvement is the first priority, with [out-of-state]
placements as the last option").
19. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 591 n.5 (1999) (private right of action under ADA); see also
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (private right of action under Medicaid, gen-
erally); Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); see also Pashby v. Cansler, 279
F.R.D. 347, 354 (2011) (private right of action under Medicaid comparability provision, 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (2006)); see also Antrican v. Buell, 158 F. Supp. 2d 663, 672 (E.D.N.C.
2001) aff'd sub nom. Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 2002) (private right of action
under Medicaid EPSDT provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) (2006)).
20. See Geraldo Rivera - The P&A System, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRA7sX
FYSCY.
21. See id.
22. See id (highlighting Mr. Rivera's 1972 investigative report on the conditions at Willow-
brook State School in New York).
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ized treatment, as well as something that those without disabilities
take for granted every day: dignity.
This work culminated in the 1999 landmark ruling, Olmstead v. L.
C. by Zimring,2 3 where the United States Supreme Court, in interpret-
ing the ADA, enshrined the following principles in disability jurispru-
dence: First, the "community integration" mandate requires that a
fundamental goal of mental illness and disability treatment-particu-
larly inpatient treatment-must be to reintegrate the people receiving
those treatments back into their communities.2 4 Second, the "least re-
strictive treatment" mandate requires that mental health and disabil-
ity treatment must be conducted in the least restrictive-medically
necessary-setting possible.2 5 And third, while the ADA may not re-
quire a particular "standard of care" for mental health or disability
services rendered, states cannot discriminate "with regard to the ser-
vices they in fact provide." 26
In response to Olmstead, then-Governor Easley and the North Car-
olina General Assembly entered into, what facially appeared to be, a
comprehensive mental health reform effort.27 They created a Joint
Legislative Oversight Committee on Mental Health, Developmental
Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services (MH/DD/SAS) as part of
a complete "paradigm shift" in the provision of MH/DD/SA ser-
vices.28 Specifically, the state emphasized the need for a locally con-
trolled, community-based service model and found that "[m]any of
the individuals currently [receiving inpatient treatment], in all levels of
care, could be treated in community-based services if such services were
available."29 Moreover, the state "recognized that [many] individuals
23. 527 U.S. 581, 592 (1999).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 599-600.
26. Id. at 603 n.14.
27. See generally An Act to Establish the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee on Mental
Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services, and to Direct the Oversight
Committee to Develop a Plan to Reform the State System for Mental Health, Developmental
Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services, §1, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 473, 473("The General
Assembly finds that . . . recent federal court decisions, compel the State to consider significant
changes in the operation and utilization of State psychiatric hospital services.").
28. See id.; Ralph Campbell Jr., State Auditor, Transmittal letter to The Honorable James
B. Hunt, Jr., Governor to Members of the North Carolina General Assembly, Secretary H.
David Bruton, NC DHHS, & Citizens of the State of North Carolina (Mar 31, 2000), in Smiov
o STATE PSYCHIATRIC HOsPITAI-S AND AREA MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS (Apr. 1, 2000)
[hereinafter N.C. STUDY OF STATE PSYCHIATRIC HosP'ITAis], available at http://www.ncauditor.
net/EPSWeb[Reports/Performance/PER-0184.pdf.
29. N.C. STUDY OF STATE PSYCInATRIC HOSPITAIS, supra note 28; see also An Act to Es-
tablish the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disabili-
ties, and Substance Abuse Services, and to Direct the Oversight Committee to Develop a Plan to
Reform the State System for Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse
Services, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 473, 473 ("[T]he "Study of State Psychiatric Hospitals and Area
Mental Health Programs . . . present[s] a comprehensive blueprint for reform of the State's
5
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who [have] serious mental illnesses would be unable to 'live success-
fully in the community without [appropriate] services, support, and
guidance.' "30
On a practical level, the Governor and the General Assembly
promised to close "about half the beds in state mental hospitals," pool
the leftover money into a mental health trust fund, and then use that
fund to provide comprehensive and community-based mental health
services to North Carolinians.3 1 By 2001, half of those beds were
closed.3 2 North Carolina's laws no longer referred to people with disa-
bilities as having "problems," but instead as "individuals with needs
for . . . services . . . [that will] maximize their quality of life."" It
seemed as though North Carolina was on its way to realizing meaning-
ful mental health reform.
B. North Carolina's Failed Mental Health Reform Effort for People
Over the Age of Eighteen
Unfortunately, what appeared to be the foundation of a laudable
mental health reform effort turned out to be a plan that was "poorly
designed and even more poorly implemented." 34 The institutional
beds were being closed, but almost no community-based services were
implemented to replace them." Instead, the Governor and the Gen-
mental health system . . . [and] the General Assembly endorses [its] findings. ) (emphasis
added).
30. Complaint by Disability Rights NC to the United States Department of Justice on be-
half of Individuals with Mental Illness living in Adult Care Homes in North Carolina (July 22,
2010) [hereinafter Adult Care Home Complaint] (quoting N.C. DE-T. HEALTHiii & HUMAN
SRVs., STATE PLAN 2001: A Bi ui--ieNTr FOR CHANGE 2, 16 (Nov. 30, 2001)).
31. Michael Biesecker, Feds Probing North Carolina's Mental Health System, NEws & On-
siEiRvERi, Nov. 25, 2010, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/11/25/825089/feds-prob-
ing-mental-health.html ("North Carolina legislators approved an ambitious reform plan aimed at
bringing the state's mental health system into compliance with Olmstead by downsizing state
hospitals and launching new community treatment programs through private companies."); see
An Act to Phase In Implementation of Mental Health Reform at the State and Local Level,
§1.7(b), 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2237, 2237-40. ("[Before the closure of any state institution,] [t]he
Secretary shall . . . [p]resent a plan . . . [that] shall address specifically how patients will be cared
for after closure, how support services to community-based agencies and outreach services will
be continued .... ).
32. See Biesecker, supra note 31.
33. An Act to Phase in Implementation of Mental Health System Reform at the State and
Local Level, §1.1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2232, 2233.
34. Chris Fitzsimon, Mental health reform 2.0, NORTH CAROLINA Poicy WATcH, Jun. 9,
2008 http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/cms/2008/06/09/mental-health-reform-20/ (last visited Nov.
28, 2013)(using data complied by the N.C. Justice Ctr.). .
35. Biesecker, supra note 31. ("[T]he Easley administration closed about half the beds in
state mental hospitals, although the planned community treatment system was not in place. The
governor and legislators then raided the trust fund set up to pay for mental health reform to
close a hole in the state budget."). The few community-based services that did exist, were often
wasteful and of questionable efficacy. For instance, community-based "providers" employed a
workforce - ninety-eight percent of which had only a high school education - primarily to take
6
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eral Assembly "raided" the state's suddenly-full mental health trust
fund in order to fill gaps in the state budget. 36 As a result, many of
the former residents of North Carolina's psychiatric hospitals found
themselves on the streets with no meaningful services or supports.
And the pattern continued. In 2007 alone, nearly 1,200 mental health
patients were discharged to homeless shelters.
With nowhere else to go, many former residents found themselves
warehoused again, this time in adult care homes, places designed for
the frail or elderly, not for the treatment of severe mental illness.3 9
Adult care home staff members were ill-equipped to handle this influx
and the severity of residents' conditions; when residents experienced
psychotic delusions, sometimes people died.4 0 Squalor and filth re-
turned to the institutional setting and pervaded many of the adult care
homes.4' This continued until 2010 when the United States Depart-
ment of Justice learned of the situation, threatened to take action
against the state, and forced North Carolina into lengthy settlement
negotiations.42 Those negotiations resulted in a settlement agreement,
signed in August 2012, which cost North Carolina $287 million.4 3
However, since the settlement agreement, North Carolina has pri-
marily focused its energy on closing adult care homes that contain
"too many" people with mental illness, lest the state be forced to pay
for the residents' treatment without the assistance of federal Medicaid
clients shopping or to the movies, all the while charging North Carolina taxpayers $61 per hour.
Pat Stith & David Raynor, Mental-Health Changes Aimed to Improve Community Treatment, but
Providers Took Clients Shopping, Swimming and to Movies for $61 an Hour, NEws & On-
SERVER, Feb. 24, 2008 [hereinafter Providers Took Clients Shopping], available at http://www.
inthepublicinterest.org/article/reform-wastes-millions-fails-mentally-ill. That is what constituted
"community-based services" in North Carolina. In all, the state wasted $400 million on this ven-
ture. Pat Smith & David Raynor, Reform Wastes Millions, Enriches Providers, Fails to Serve
Mentally Ill, NEws & OBSIRVER, Feb. 24, 2008, available at http://media2.newsobserver.com/
static/content/pdf/disorder.pdf. On some years, less than 5% of those funds were spent on ser-
vices that might actually keep people out of mental institutions. Providers Took Clients
Shopping.
36. Biesecker, supra note 31.
37. See Fitzsimon, supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. See Licensing of Homes for the Aged and Infirm, 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 13F (2012);
Licensing of Family Care Homes, 10A N.C. ADMIN. CoDE 13G (2012); see also Adult Care
Home Complaint, supra note 30; DIsAII rY Riirs NC, TRAPPED IN A FRACrURED SYSTEM:
PEOPLE WIH MFNTAL ILNIESS IN ADuLT CARE HOMES (Aug2010), available at http://www.
disabilityrightsnc.org/sites/default/filesfrrapped%20in%20a%20Fractured%20System.pdf.
40. See Adult Care Home Complaint, supra note 30, Summary of Findings, at 12-15.
41. Id., Adult Care Home Facility Summaries, at 1-22.
42. Lynn Bonner, State Reaches Agreement with Feds Over Treatment of Mentally Ill, NEws
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dollars.4 4 And similar to the psychiatric hospital downsize of 2001, the
state has neglected to implement any meaningful community-based
services to fill the service gap after these facilities are closed.4 5 Just as
in 2001, these former residents find themselves at risk of having no-
where to go. 4 6 Generally, with a continued lack of comprehensive
community-based mental health services in place, anyone over eigh-
teen faces a stark lack of intensive mental health services in North
Carolina.
C. "Best Practices" Is Not Synonymous with "Evidence-Based"
Unfortunately, the failure does not end there. Throughout the
1990s, the medical/mental health community began to notice discon-
nects between treatment methodologies and outcomes.47 In response,
doctors began to focus on the inextricable link between data-driven
treatment and successful outcomes. This shift in thinking resulted in
the adoption of "evidence-based" practices. 48 Its most notable feature:
data.4 9 In order for a treatment to be deemed "evidence-based," a
treatment's efficacy has to be supported by peer-reviewed, reproduci-
ble, empirical data. In the mental health arena, it is the "gold stan-
dard" for treatment.so
44. See TARA LARSON, N.C. Div. OF MED. ASSISTANCE, MEDICAL CARE ADVISORY COM-
MITEEF UPDATE ON PERSONAL CARE SERVICES & INSTfIUTION OF MiENTAL DISEASE 17-32
(Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dma/mcac/20120907%20MCAC%20PCS%
20and%20IMD.pdf; Adult Care Home Plan for N.C. Under Way, WINSToN-SALEM J (July 26,
2012, 2:40 PM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/article-cd7825d1-e504-5152-ab32-c666
a5c08a61.html; Martha Quillin, NC Screening Process for Mental Illness has Slowed Placements,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 3, 2013), available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/11/03/33392
13/screening-process-for-mental-illness.html. When a facility has been identified as being an In-
stitute for Mental Disease ("IMD"), all of the residents in that facility lose their Medicaid fund-
ing as long as they continue to reside in that facility. See NAT'L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS
("NAMI"), BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON IMD EXCLUSION, http://www.nami.org/Tem-
plate.cfm?Section=March9&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=
44050.
45. See supra notes 27-38; Mandy Locke, Mentally Ill in N.C. Could Face Loss of Homes,
NEWS & OBSERVIR, Aug. 14, 2012, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/08/14/141189
z3/mentally-ill-could-face-loss-of.html#storylink=cpy.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., Paul Kettlewell, Service and Science: A powerful Combination (June 21, 2002),
available at http://www.apadivisions.org/division-31/publications/articles/pennsylvania/kettlewell.
pdf.
48. JEREMY H. HOWICK, THE PHILOSOPH-Y OF EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE 15 (2011); see
also Kathleen S. Oman, Christine Duran, & Regina Fink, Evidence-Based Policy and Proce-
dures: An Algorithm for Success 38 J. NURSING ADMIN. 47, 48-49 (2008) (discussing quality of
evidence).
49. U.S. DEP' T. HiEALTiH1 AND HUMAN SERVS., SCIENCE TO SERVICE: IMPLEMENTING Evi-
DENCE-BASFD MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 5-6 (2005) [hereinafter U.S. SCIFNCF 10 SERVICE
RIEPORTI], available at http://www.namhpac.org/PDFs/01/sciencetoservice.pdf.
50. PAMELA S. HYDE, SECRETARY, ET AL., N.M. HUMAN SE Rvs. DEP'T., TURNING KNOWL-
EDGE INTO PRACICE: A MANUAL FIOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATORS AND PRACTI-
TIONERS ABOUT UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTlCES 49 (Fall
2013] 73
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By 2005, the United States Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA) had developed free toolkits for
states, which provide comprehensive, step-by-step guidance on setting
up and implementing evidence-based practices.5 ' Furthermore, re-
search has shown that these toolkits are immensely helpful in actually
implementing an evidence-based system of care.5 2 Most providers are
able to achieve a high rate of compliance with evidence-based pro-
gram parameters within twelve months of their adoption.53
The timing of this general movement towards evidence-based prac-
tices and the beginnings of North Carolina's mental health reform ef-
fort might have seemed serendipitous, had the state actually adopted
an evidence-based model for its mental health service system. Of
course, at the time, the state proclaimed that it would.5 4 It even cre-
ated a widely circulated science to service blueprint for implementing
comprehensive evidence-based practices throughout North Caro-
lina. Unfortunately, that blueprint was quietly scrapped.5 6 Instead,
2003), available at http://www.acmha.org/content/reports/EBPManual.pdf (internal quotations
omitted).
51. See U.S. SCIENCE To SERVICE RiuPORT, supra note 49, at 26-27; see, e.g., SUBSTANCE
ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., GETTING STARTED WITH EVI-
DENCE-BASED PRACTICES: ASSERTIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT, available at
http://store.samhsa.gov/product/Assertive-Community-Treatment-ACT-Evidence-Based-Prac-
tices-EBP-KITSMAO8-4345. And North Carolina was aware of these toolkits at the time they
were being developed. See The Implementation Toolkits, N.C. Sa. to SERV. PROJECT, https://
web.archive.org/web/20050326043649/http://www.ncs2s.org/td-background.toolkit.shtmI (ac-
cessed by searching http://www.ncs2s.org/td background toolkit.shtml in the Internet Archive
index).
52. Gregory J. McHugo, et al., Fidelity Outcomes in the National Implementing Evidence-
Based Practices Project, 58 Psychiatric Servs. 1279, 1282, Figure 1 (2007).
53. Id.
54. See infra note 55.
55. N.C. SCIENCE T1o SERVICE CONSORTIUM, BRIDGING SCIENCE AND SERVICE: A PLAN To
IMPLEMENT EVIDENCE-BASED PRACrlCES FOR ADuLTs wrmH MENTAL ILLNESS IN NORTH CAR-
OLINA'S PUBLIC MENTAL HEALIH SYSTEM (2004) [hereinafter N.C. SCIENCE TO SERVICE
BLUEPRINT], available at https://web.archive.org/web/20050908030913/http://www.ncs2s.org/ (ac-
cessed by searching http://www.ncs2s.org in the Internet Archive index); see also Letter from
Beth Melcher, Project Director, N.C. Science to Service Consortium, to Michael Moseley Direc-
tor, Div. MH/DD/SAS (Aug. 2, 2004), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20050908030913/
http://www.ncs2s.org/ (accessed by searching http://www.ncs2s.org in the Internet Archive index)
(presenting the N.C. SCIENCE TO SERVICE BLUEPRINT to the director of N.C. MH/DD/SAS);
JOINT LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT COMMITFEE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILI-
TIES, AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY oF NoRTHI CAI-
OLINA at 6 (2005) [hereinafter N.C. OVERSIGHT CoMMfrffEE REPoRTr], available at http://ncleg.
net/Library/studies/2005/nr25.pdf (informing the General Assembly of Dr. Melcher's presenta-
tion of the N.C. SCIENCE TO SERVICE BLUEPRINT to the joint legislative oversight committee).
56. The N.C. OVERSIGHT COMM nifEILE REPORT, supra note 55, at 6, indicates that the N.C.
SCIENCE 10 SE.RVICE BLUEPRINT "is available in its entirety" on the North Carolina Science to
Service Consortium website, www.ncs2s.org. However, this website no longer exists. After an
extensive internet search, the author was unable to find a publicly available copy of this report
on any active websites. In fact, since January 2005, the Oversight Committee has not mentioned
the N.C. SCIENCE TO SERVICE BLUEPRINT in its minutes even once.
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since 2001, the state has incorporated into its service definitions only
one evidence-based intensive mental health treatment.5 7 Most nota-
bly, for the purposes of this paper, that treatment can be utilized only
by people over the age of twenty-one.5 8
In lieu of adopting evidence-based models of treatment, the state
adopted an alternative term to describe its services: "best practices." 59
Although, "[t]he terms 'best practice' and 'evidence-based practice'
are often used interchangeably," they are not the same thing.60 "Best
practices" is loosely defined and, in some respects, has some praise-
worthy ideas behind it.61 However, what is missing under the "best
practices" model-in stark contrast to an evidence-based one-is the
requirement that treatments be proven to work.6 2 In North Carolina,
a "treatment" can be full of good intentions, but otherwise completely
ineffectual, and still be considered a "best practice." Because of the
lack of data, almost every sanctioned mental health service in North
Carolina could fall into this category.
57. N.C. Div. of Med. Assistance Enhanced Mental Health & Substance Abuse Serv.,
Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8A at 68 [hereinafter Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8A], available
at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dma/mp/8A.pdf (describing Assertive Community Treatment Teams).
The state has also adopted something called "multisystemic therapy," although it is geared to-
wards juvenile delinquents. See id. at 48. Therapeutic foster care is also evidence-based, but
takes place in "family setting homes" and is minimally restrictive. See U.S. SCI.Nce 'o SRVICe
supra note 49, at 40; N.C. Div. of Med. Assistance Enhanced Mental Health & Substance Abuse
Serv., Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-2 at 6 [hereinafter Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-2],
available at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dma/mp/8D2.pdf ("Level II therapeutic foster care providers
are licensed under Division of Social Service (131-D) as family setting homes."); cf infra notes
63-66 and corresponding text (outlining levels of treatment restrictiveness).
58. Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8A, supra note 57, at 6 (indicating that Assertive Commu-
nity Treatment Teams can only be utilized by people "[a]ge 21+").
59. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STA r. §122C-102 (2011) ("The State Plan shall include ... promo-
tion of best practices . . . .") ("evidence-based" practices are mentioned nowhere in N.C. GEN.
STAT. §122C); Press Release, NC DHHS, DHHS Secretary Gets Support in Revamping Future
of Mental Health Care (Jan. 7, 2011) ("'We will concentrate our efforts and our resources on
providing tested and proven "best practices" of mental health, developmental disability and sub-
stance abuse treatment' ") (quoting Lanier M. Cansler, NC DHHS Secretary), available at http://
www.ncdhhs.gov/pressrel/2011/2011-01-07-cabha.htm.
60. Definitions, N.C. EvjDENcE. BASED PRACTICES CTR., http://www.ncebpcenter.org/index.
php?option=com content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=49 (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
61. See infra notes 160-73.
62. Emerging Practices, U. KAN. ScIl. Soc. WELFARE, https://web.archive.org/web/2012
0412095145/http://www.socwel.ku.edu/mentalhealth/projects/Emerging/index.shtml ("[A] true
evidence-based practice .. . [is supported by at least] five published scientifically rigorous studies
using consistent dependent variables.") (accessed by searching http://www.socwel.ku.edu/
mentalhealth/projects/Emerging/index.shtmi in the Internet Archive index); Evidence-Based
Practices, VT. DEP'T MENTAL HEALTi, http://mentalhealth.vermont.gov/ebp ("'Evidence-based'
stands in contrast to approaches that are based on tradition, convention, belief, or anecdotal
evidence.").
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D. North Carolina's Failed Mental Health Reform Effort for
Children
1. The Rise of PRTFs
During the initial reform effort, North Carolina emphasized the
need to provide local area programs with "flexibility" to provide as
many community-based services as possible to children with mental
illness. 6 3 The state also created a graduated service structure for chil-
dren's inpatient treatment consisting of five levels, each more restric-
tive than the last:
Level I is a low to moderate structured and supervised environment
level of care provided in a family setting . . . Level II is a moderate to
high structured supervised environment level of care provided in a
group home . . . or a family setting [such as therapeutic foster care 64]
... Level III is a highly structured and supervised environment level
of care in a program setting only . . . Level IV is a level of care pro-
vided in a physically secure, locked environment in a program
setting.6 5
Finally, psychiatric hospitalization is "designed to provide treatment
for individuals who have acute psychiatric problems . . . and is the
most intensive and restrictive type of facility for individuals." 6 6
Of the five different levels of treatment, only Level I is specifically
identified as "targeted" to treat "children under age [twenty-one]." 67
63. See N.C. SUov o STATE PsYcIATRic HosVrrALs, supra note 28, Section II. Mental
Health and Substance Abuse Structure, Services and Finances at 95 ("[F]Iexibility'in funding
[would allow local area programs] the latitude to develop services for children and adolescents
that were preventative, school or home based, and tailored to individual needs . .. These are
exactly the types of services that are needed, especially if the state wants to reduce its reliance on
state hospitals and other high cost residential facilities."); see also An Act to Establish the Joint
Legislative Oversight Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance
Abuse Services, and to Direct the Oversight Committee to Develop a Plan to Reform the State
System for Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services, 2000
N.C. Sess. Laws 473, 473 ("[T]he "Study of State Psychiatric Hospitals and Area Mental Health
Programs" . . . present[s] a comprehensive blueprint for reform of the State's mental health
system . . . [and] the General Assembly endorses [its] findings .... ).
64. Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-2, supra note 57, at 6 ("Level II therapeutic foster care
providers are licensed under Division of Social Service (131-D) as family setting homes.").
65. NC DHHS, STATE PLAN UNDER TIrni XIX OF THE SOCIAL SEcuurry ACr MmojCAL
ASSISTANCE7 PROGRAM, ATrACHMENT 3.1-A.1, 15A.19-20 (May 1980), available at http://www.
ncdhhs.gov/dmalplan/sp.pdf.
66. 10A N.C. ADMIN. CoDE 27G.6001. For purposes of this paper, someone who requires
this highest and most restrictive level of care will be referred to as needing "acute" treatment.
Someone who still requires intensive mental health services, but not yet at a psychiatric hospital
level of care, will be referred to as requiring "non-acute" treatment.
67. Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-2, supra note 57, at 14 ("[Level I treatment] is a ser-
vice targeted to children under age [twenty-one], which offers a low to moderate structured and
supervised environment in a family setting . . . ."). However, the PRTF service definition does
acknowledge they are supposed to be serving youth through age twenty-one. See Clinical Cover-
age Policy No.: 8D-1, supra note 3, at 1 ("PRTF services are available to Medicaid recipients
under [twenty-one] years of age.").
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Coincidentally, Level I treatment also is the only treatment level not
specifically covered in 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 27G, which contains
regulations for each of the other five treatment levels.68 Otherwise,
the North Carolina Administrative Code expressly limits Level II-IV
facilities to serving children and adolescents only until the age of
eighteen.69
In 2005, the state introduced a sixth level of care, which is more
restrictive than Level IV facilities but less restrictive than psychiatric
hospitals: PRTFs. 70 Here too, although the federal government de-
signed PRTF treatment was to serve youth through age twenty-one,
North Carolina regulations limit in-state PRTFs to serving children
only until they turn eighteen71 In light of the earlier distinction be-
tween "evidence-based" practices and "best practices," it is pertinent
to note that PRTF treatment does not meet even the marginal criteria
to be considered a "best practice." 7 2
Subsequently, the state has begun phasing out Level III and IV fa-
cilities.73 This essentially bifurcated inpatient-level mental health ser-
68. See 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 27G (2012).
69. See 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 27G §§ .1301(a), .1303(a), .1303(d) (2012) (requiring that
Level It facilities only serve "children and adolescents" as defined in 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE
27G.0103 (2012), thus until they turn 18, although "[i]f an adolescent has his 18th birthday while
receiving treatment in a residential facility, he may continue in the facility for six months or until
the end of the state fiscal year, whichever is longer") (emphasis added); see also 10A N.C. AD-
MIN. CODE 27G §§ .1301(b), .1701(a), .1706(e) (2012) (regarding Level III and Level IV facili-
ties, with the same age restrictions).
70. See Psychiatric Residential Treatment for Children and Adolescents, 10A N.C. ADMIN.
ConE §§ 27G.1901-.1903 (Nov. 1, 2005); Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facility Services
(PRTF); Psychiatric Residential Treatment Services, Eliada Homes, http://www.eliada.org/pro-
grams/treatment/prtf ("Eliada Homes, Inc. opened the first Psychiatric Residential Treatment
Facility program, in western North Carolina in 2006, beginning with one 9 bed cottage for ado-
lescent females."). The N.C. ADMIN. CODE describes Level IV treatment as being geared to-
wards children and adolescents who require "treatment in a staff secure setting" where, inter
alia, "staff are required to be awake during client sleep hours," 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE
27G.1701, while PRTF treatment is geared towards "children or adolescents who do not meet
criteria for [a psychiatric hospital level of] care, but do require supervision and specialized inter-
ventions on a 24-hour basis," 10A N.C. ADMIN. Coon 27G.1901. See generally Clinical Coverage
Policy No.: 8D-1, supra note 3. However, the first PRFT was not actually created until 2006.
71. 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 27G.1901(b) (2012) (regarding PRTF's only serving "children
and adolescents" as defined in 1OA N.C. ADMIN. CODE 27G.0103 (2012), thus until they turn 18,
but notably there is no option for extending treatment "for six months [after a resident's eight-
eenth birthday] or until the end of the state fiscal year" like there is in Level II-IV facilities); cf
Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-1, supra note 3, at 1 ("PRTF services are available to Medicaid
recipients under [twenty-one] years of age.").
72. See infra note 209 (discussing a recent study by the United States Department of Health
and Human Services, which demonstrated that replacing community-based services for institu-
tionalization in PRTFs resulted in better outcomes for youth and only cost a third as much).
73. See NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DivisION OF
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, LME ROLE IN THE CLOSURE OF LEVEL III AND LEVEL IV GRouP HOME
FACILITIES STATEWIDE, available at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dma/provider/budgetinitiative/
LMERoleGroupHomeClosure.pdf ("[NC DHHS] shall report on its plan for transitioning chil-
dren out of Level III and Level IV group homes.").
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2013], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol36/iss1/5
78 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:66
vices for children in North Carolina. And although the stated purpose
of this effort is to encourage the utilization of "community based ser-
vices," intensive, evidence-based community-based services do not ex-
ist for North Carolina's children. 74 Furthermore, there is no mention
of phasing out PRTFs as part of this effort. The de facto result is that
children who require more than minimally restrictive settings increas-
ingly will be institutionalized in extremely restrictive PRTF facilities. 75
And because PRTFs are essentially allowed to cherry-pick which chil-
dren they serve, as children with less-intensive needs fill up the
PRTFs, complex/hard-to-serve children can find themselves without
any in-state treatment options.
As for the children who do find PRTF placements, as soon as they
turn eighteen, they too are either dropped from the system or forced
out-of-state in order to continue with the exact same level of treat-
ment they were already receiving. Of course, before a youth is allowed
to seek out-of-state placement, that youth has to apply to, and be re-
jected from, every PRTF in the state-even from facilities where he or
74. See id.
75. In fact, while rates of child institutionalization are generally decreasing on a national
level, these rates for North Carolina's children are skyrocketing. See Kw's CAUGIfI IN A
Dounii, BINo supra note 10, at 2
76. Compounding the issue is the fact that North Carolina draws a fairly bright-line distinc-
tion between mental health providers and intellectual disability providers. See id. at 3 ("The
State separates services between Mental Health (MH) and Developmental Disabilities (DD),
and the process for getting services for an individual with complex needs is confusing and diffi-
cult. Sometimes the services do not exist at all [in-state]."); Telephone interview with Becky
Fields, former clinical director, F.A.C.T. Specialized Services (Level Ill Facility) (Jan. 23, 2013);
see also North Carolina Clinical Coverage Policies §§ 8A-8D-2, available at http://www.ncdhhs.
gov/dma/mp/ (for mental/behavior health designated providers); cf Clinical Coverage Policy 8E,
supra note 9 (for intellectual disability designated providers). Any given provider can be one or
the other, but not both. See North Carolina Clinical Coverage Policies §§ 8A-8D-2, available at
http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dma/mp/ (for mental/behavior health designated providers); cf Clinical
Coverage Policy 8E, supra note 9 (for intellectual disability designated providers). But cf Mu-
DOCK CENTER, http://www.murdochcenter.org (a state-run Intermediate Care Facility for indi-
vidual with Mental Retardation ("ICF/MR") that provides some dual-diagnosis services.
However, this service can be time limited. See Telephone Interview with Mother of a Dually-
Diagnosed Child in the Eighteen to Twenty-one Age Range (Jan. 25, 2013) (noting that her child
quickly regressed once he had to stop receiving services at the Murdock Center after only a
year). This disconnect creates a significant barrier to providers attempting to treat complex/hard-
to-serve children. See Telephone Interview with Becky Fields. Even Michael Watson, former
Deputy Secretary of NC DHHS acknowledged that state regulations "discourage facilities from
accepting high-risk patients." Lynn Bonner, Report Rips N.C. Over Mentally Ill Kids, NIws &
Onsraizviniz, Jan, 12, 2012, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/01/12/1771229/report-
rips-nc-over-mentally-ill.html. Generally, "mental health" providers cannot bill for developmen-
tal disability services, and "intellectual disability" providers cannot bill for mental health ser-
vices. See Telephone Interview with Becky Fields. The expense of hiring additional staff to
bridge the gap must come out of the providers' own profits. Id. That is why it generally does not
happen and why "North Carolina has only one in-state specialty provider to treat [children] with
... dual diagnoses." Id.; KIDS CAUGHT IN A Dounui. BIND, supra note 9, at 3. As such, place-
ment in a PRTF is often as close to "appropriate" services as many complex/hard-to-serve chil-
dren can get in-state.
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she does not satisfy the age or gender requirements. Furthermore,
this process can take weeks or even months.78 For a family whose
child is in crisis, this can be devastating.
2. North Carolina Lacks Comprehensive Oversight Over Its
Children's Care Once They are Placed Out-of-State
Under North Carolina's current treatment system, once children
with severe mental illness turn eighteen, or become "too complicated"
to treat, their in-state treatment options essentially vanish. Their fami-
lies' only remaining recourse is to seek treatment in another state or
77. Telephone Interview with Becky Fields, supra note 76; see e.g., MeckLINK Behavioral
Healthcare, Provider Hot Sheet, available at http://charmeck.org/mecklenburg/county/Area-
MentalHealth/ForProviders/Hot%20Sheets/12312012HotSheet.pdf ("If you are pursuing admis-
sion to an out-of state PRTF facility, written denial letters from all in-state PRTF facilities must
be obtained prior to [submitting your request] . . . ." (emphasis added)).
78. See GERAiD3 AKLAND & ANN AKLAND, WAKE CouNTy, NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON
MENTAL ILLNESS, STATE PsYcIIIAmc HOSPrfAi ADMIssION DiLAYS IN NORTH CAROLINA,
JANUARY-JUNE 2010 2 (Aug. 6, 2010); Telephone Interview with Becky Fields, supra note 76.
79. The state's heavy reliance on privatized PRTFs also has created some major problems
during treatment. Of the approximately forty licensed PRTFs in North Carolina, only one is run
by the state. See supra note 3; NC State Operated Facilities, NC DHHS, http://www.ncdhhs.gov/
dsohf/facilitycontacts.htm. Although the state runs one other similar program called Wright
School. Notably, the Department of Public Instruction ("DPI") provides the residents of this
state-run PRTF with a public school education, where course credit is transferrable upon dis-
charge. Whitaker PRTF, NC DHHS, http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dsohf/services/whitaker.htm,
("[C]hildren [at Whitaker School] are entitled to a free and appropriate public education under
North Carolina law.").
In the privatized PRTFs, this is not necessarily the case. See Complaint by Disability Rights NC
on Behalf of Children with Mental Illness/Developmental Disabilities Placed in Private Psychiat-
ric Residential Treatment Facilities (May 11, 2012) [hereinafter PRTF Complaint]; cf 10A N.C.
ADMIN. CODE 27G .1903(f) (2012) ("Children or adolescents residing in a PRTF shall receive
educational services through a facility-based school."). According to a recent complaint by Disa-
bility Rights NC, children in many privatized PRFTs receive virtually no education. See PRTF
Complaint, at 7-9. Where they do, the education is often minimal and not age-appropriate, and
any "credits" that they earn do not transfer. Id. This is because the facilities, DPI, and the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services ("NC DHHS") are in an ongoing stalemate
over who is responsible for educating children in privatized PRTFs, in spite of an explicit statu-
tory directive to resolve the issue. Id. at 5-7, 9-11; see An Act to Require the State Board of
Education and Department of Health and Human Services to Determine Responsibility for
Children with Disabilities Places in Private Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facilities by Public
Agencies Other Than Local Educational Agencies, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 698, 698-99 ("The
State Board of Education and Department of Health and Human Services shall jointly meet and
make a determination as to which public agency is responsible for providing special education
and related services . . . for children with disabilities who are placed in private psychiatric resi-
dential treatment facilities . . . ."). In the meantime, children receiving PRTF services are being
set up for failure after discharge. Fortunately, the North Carolina General Assembly may take a
more active role in resolving this matter. See A Bill to be Entitled An Act To Provide for the
Education of Children in Private Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facilities, H.B. 831, 2013
Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/House/PDF/H83lv3.pdf.
The bill passed a second reading almost unanimously in July of this year. See House Bill 831, Ed.
Services for Children in PRTFs, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/Bill-
LookUp/BillLookUp.pl?BillD= H831&Session=2013.
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to go without essential services.so When seeking the former, North
Carolina places the burden for finding and acquiring out-of-state
PRTF placements on county-level Managed Care Organizations
(LME-MCOs)8 ' and families.82 Once youth are placed out-of-state,
the state relies on LME-MCOs to continue overseeing their care.
Unfortunately, this only "sometimes" happens,84 which is not entirely
surprising given that the state does not have an enforcement mecha-
nism to ensure LME-MCOs' compliance with this duty." As a result,
North Carolina's children are falling through the cracks once they get
shipped out of state for treatment.86
E. Even Amid Failure, Meaningful Mental Health Reform is Still
Within Reach
As it stands today, North Carolina's mental health reform effort is
generally viewed as a failure-even the recently retired secretary of
NC DHHS has declared that the "[r]eform [effort] is over."8 7 What
80. See supra notes 13-15 and corresponding text.
81. Previously known as Local Management Entities ("LME"s), which are in the process of
transitioning into Managed Care Organizations ("MCO"s) as part of the state's ongoing reform
effort. See generally Anna North & Jay Taylor, presentation to NC Providers Council Confer-
ence, LME/MCO Challenges with Managed Care: Addressing the Challenge Together (Nov. 5,
2011), available at http://www.ncproviderscouncil.org/Portals/ncproviderscouncil.org/NC%20
Tides-LME-MCO%20Challenges%20with%20Managed %20Care-Jay%2OTaylor.pdf. Some-
times, they collectively are referred to as "LME-MCO"s.
82. COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION PROTOCOL supra note 14 at 5.
83. See id. at 4 ("On-going [utilization review] is also conducted by the AP / LME with
active case management involvement."); Interstate Compact on Mental Health, N.C. GEN. STA-r.
§122C-361 (2011) (defining interstate compact responsibilities only in terms of contracting
"party states"); cf Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-
3800-06 (2011) (codifying North Carolina's interstate compact on out-of-state adoptions, which
includes "a party state officer or employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or
employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency
or other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party
state" among those who might be responsible for a child's welfare during and after placement).
84. Telephone interview with high-ranking MH/DD/SAS official (Jan.18, 2013) [hereinafter
MH/DD/SAS Interview] (acknowledging that continued oversight by LME-MCOs only "some-
times" occurs); Telephone interview with Iris Green, Senior Attorney, Kid's Team, Disability
Rights NC (Jan. 24, 2013); see, e.g., Kins CAUGHT IN A DOUBLE BIND supra note 10, at 3 (noting
an instance where a child was transferred to a PRTF in Virginia, at which point "the North
Carolina LME stopped participating in [the child's] continued treatment and discharge
planning").
85. MD/DD/SAS Interview, supra note 84.
86. Telephone interview with Iris Green, supra note 84.
87. Michael Biesecker, Mental Health Rules Remade, NEws & OBSERVER, Jan. 8, 2011,
available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/01/08/906666/mental-health-rules-remade.html
(quoting Lanier Cansler, Secretary of Health and Human Services); see Bonner, supra note 76
(outlining "horror stories" from families trying to obtain mental health services for their chil-
dren"); Tom Campbell, Let's Take the Time to Get Mental Health Reform Right, HERAILD SUN
(Nov. 15, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://www.heraldsun.com/opinion/opinioncolumnists/x2082481972/
Let-s-take-the-time-to-get-mental-health-reform-right (noting that "North Carolina's 2001
mental health 'reforms' have been a disaster"); see generally NAMI WAKE COUNTY, INDICA-
15
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started off as a move towards a cost-effective, community-based
model of care, instead resulted in a doubling down on restrictive inpa-
tient treatment and the state abdicating its responsibilities to many of
its youth.
Fundamental, meaningful reform is needed now, more than ever. If
North Carolina were to implement comprehensive, evidence-based,
community-based services-similar to the services that it promised
over a decade ago-many of these problems would solve themselves.
Other states have done it, expediently and with resounding success. 8
To that end, the potential of North Carolina's mental health reform
effort is still within reach.
II. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES OF NOT PROVIDING APPROPRIATE
IN-STATE SERVICES
The primary thesis of this Article is that North Carolina's mental
health system for youth violates numerous federal laws and the state's
own policies. One must first know how something is broken before
one can fix it. The proceeding section examines the laws and policies
being violated by North Carolina's mental health system for youth.
A. North Carolina's Violation of Medicaid Provisions
The purpose of Medicaid is to help people who are poor and/or
disabled receive appropriate medical care." Medicaid aims to provide
"safe, effective, efficient, patient-centered, high quality and equitable
care to all enrollees."9 0 In contrast to Olmstead's interpretation of the
ADA, "the Medicaid Act clearly mandates that states provide a cer-
tain level and quality of . . . care."" In this context, North Carolina
has violated (1) Medicaid's EPSDT provisions with regard to both
complex/hard-to-serve children and eighteen to twenty-one year olds;
(2) Medicaid's comparability provision with regard to eighteen to
twenty-one year olds; and (3) Medicaid's out-of-state placement re-
quirements generally.
TORS OF THE IMPACT oiF NORTH CAROLINA'S "MEITAi HEAL:nH RiEiORM" ON PEOPLE WITH
SEVERE ME.NTAL ILLNESS (Ocr. 7, 2008), available at http://www.nami-wake.org/files/NAMI
WakeIndicatorsReport.pdf.
88. See infra Part III.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) ("The Medicaid
program was created . . . for the purpose of providing federal financial assistance to States that
choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.").
90. Quality of Care, MEDICAID.GOv, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-In-
formation/By-Topics/Quality-of-Care/Quality-of-Care.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
91. Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 191 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied Odom v. Antrican 537
U.S. 973 (2002) (discussing a case regarding a lack of Medicaid funded dental services.); cf
Olmstead. 527 U.S. at 603 n.14.
2013] 81
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1. Medicaid's EPSDT Provisions
Although Medicaid has many restrictions on the kinds of services
available to adults over the age of twenty-one, the bar is much lower
for Medicaid recipients who are under twenty-one years old. 92 Under
EPSDT, federal law requires that states cover any and all "services,
products, or procedures for Medicaid beneficiaries under [twenty-one
years] of age if the service is medically necessary health care to correct
or ameliorate a defect, physical or mental illness, or a [health] condi-
tion."93 Furthermore, while mental health treatment under Medicaid
is optional for states generally, EPSDT is an entitlement. 94
North Carolina recognizes that "EPSDT covers most of the medical
or remedial care a child needs to improve or maintain his/her health in
the best condition possible, compensate for a health problem, prevent
it from worsening, or prevent the development of additional health
problems."9 5 And although North Carolina laudably aims to provide
these medically necessary treatments in the most "economic mode"
possible,9 6 the state also recognizes that the treatment made available
by the state must be "similarly efficacious to the [treatment] requested
by the [youth]'s physician,. . . [and that it] does not limit the [youth]'s
right to a free choice of providers.""
EPSDT creates an affirmative duty for states to provide their youth
with a "full panoply" of EPSDT services. 98 North Carolina also de-
92. N.C. EPSDT Poticy INsrRucrIONs, supra note 16, at 2 ("EPSDT makes short-term
and long-term services available to recipients under [twenty-one] years of age without many of
the restrictions Medicaid imposes for services under a waiver OR for adults (recipients [twenty-
one] years of age and over." (emphasis omitted)); Id ("Medicaid cannot impose any waiting list
and must provide coverage for corrective treatment for recipients under [twenty-one] years of
age."); Id. ("A child under [twenty-one] years of age financially eligible for Medicaid is entitled
to receive EPSDT services without any monetary cap provided the service meets all EPSDT
criteria . . . .").
93. Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-2, supra note 57, at 1 (emphasis omitted); see 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) (2006).
94. NAMI, STATE MENTAL HEALTAHr CUTS: A NATIONAL CRISIS 9 (2011), available at http://
www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/StateAdvocacy/StateBudgetCuts-Report/NAMIS-
tateBudgetCrisis2011.pdf ("All Medicaid mental health services for children and adults fall into
the optional category, with the exception of Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment
(EPSDT) for children.").
95. Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-2, supra note 57, at 1; see N.C. EPSDT PoIcy IN-
sTRUCIONS, supra note 16, at 2 ("Medicaid ... must provide coverage for corrective treatment
for recipients under [twenty-one] years of age.").
96. Cf N.C. EPSDT Poiuicy INSTRUCIlONs, supra note 16, at 2 ("A child under [twenty-
one] years of age financially eligible for Medicaid is entitled to receive EPSDT services without
any monetary cap provided the service meets all EPSDT criteria . . . .").
97. Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-2, supra note 56, at 1 ("Medically necessary services
will be provided in the most economic mode, as long as the treatment made available is similarly
efficacious to the service requested by the beneficiary's physician . . .and the determination does
not limit the beneficiary's right to a free choice of providers.")
98. N.C. EPSDT Pou-icy INSTRUMrIONs, supra note 16, at 4.
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clares that EPSDT "[p]rocedures, products, and services . . . are cov-
ered when they are medically necessary and . . . no equally effective
and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide,"
provided that they are not simply "intended for the convenience of
the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider."" In other
words, EPSDT specifically is geared for the provision of novel, medi-
cally necessary services.' 00
Granted, on its face, Medicaid only requires states to either
"provid[e]" or "arrang[e] for" EPSDT services, not necessarily create
them.'0o However, the driving factor behind the kind of EPSDT ser-
vices that the state is obligated to "provid[e]" or "arrang[e] for" is
this: medical necessity. Were a treating physician to determine that it
was medically necessary to treat a youth's mental health needs in-
state-for the continuity of family and community involvement-then
North Carolina should be obligated to "provid[e]" and "arrang[e] for"
those services. To that end, North Carolina's EPSDT guidelines re-
quire that the state "make available a variety of individual and group
providers qualified and willing to provide EPSDT services" in-state.'0 2
There is little case law regarding an affirmative duty on states to
actually create services under Medicaid, generally. Some courts that
have addressed the issue, particularly with regard to adults over
twenty-one, have largely responded in the negative.10 3 However, these
99. Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-1, supra note 3, at 2.
100. See NAMI CENTER FOR PUBIc RiPRESENTATION, STAnri Ei1joRrs To LIMrr EPSDT
SERVICI-s PuasuANT O MEDICAID'S REASONABuE STANDARDS PRovisIoN (Apr. 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Policy/Issues-Spotlights/Medicaid/factsheet
statelimits-onEPSDT.pdf ("While States possess the discretion not to provide any of the
twenty optional services for adults, they cannot decline to offer mandatory services. However,
since this distinction is irrelevant for children pursuant to the EPSDT mandate of the Act, States
cannot invoke their discretionary authority under [Medicaid's reasonable standard's provision,
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17),] to refuse to provide a particular form of non-experimental treatment
for children,"). Unfortunately, this is exactly what North Carolina is doing. See e.g. N.C. EPSDT
POLICY INSTRUCrIONS, supra note 16, at 2 ("A child under [twenty-one] years of age financially
eligible for Medicaid is entitled to receive EPSDT services without any monetary cap provided
the service meets all EPSDT criteria . . . ."); cf id at 4 (North Carolina provided EPSDT ser-
vices must not be "experimental/investigational"); cf also infra Part III (regarding the superior
efficacy of implementing an evidence-based service system, which requires testing new services
against old ones so that outmoded services will not be used in perpetuity) By prohibiting the
provision of "experimental/investigational" services, the state essentially is banning new, cost
effective, and more effective services from being created.
101. See 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(43) (2006).
102. N.C. EPSDT POLICY INs-rizucriONs, supra note 16, at 4 ("Under EPSDT, North Caro-
lina Medicaid must make available a variety of individual and group providers qualified and
willing to provide EPSDT services.") (emphasis added).
103. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 785 (1980) (regarding due pro-
cess claims over closure of a facility that was de-certified, holding that "[Medicaid only] gives
recipients the right to choose among a range of qualified providers") (not addressing EPSDT);
Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 2003) ("As for the right to obtain a
needed medical service from a provider 'who undertakes to provide him such services,' the aim
2013]1 83
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cases did not address the issue of EPSDT compliance or there being a
complete lack of a particular provider or service type in-state, but
rather whether (1) a particular facility (among many qualified facili-
ties) was certified to provide services; (2) services already provided in-
state were convenient enough to adult Medicaid recipient's resi-
dences; or (3) the purpose of a state's behavioral plan was violated by
out-of-state placement in the instant case, largely under due process
grounds.
Courts have recognized that a complete absence of a vital service in-
state is unacceptable under Medicaid.104 The funding and provision of
Medicaid services to recipients must be "reasonable and adequate."'
With regard to eighteen to twenty-one year olds, North Carolina has
arbitrarily singled out a particular class of Medicaid recipients and de-
nied them access to specific Medicaid services in the state.1 06 Com-
plex/hard-to-serve children in North Carolina face more of a de facto
bar to services."0 ' Forcing North Carolina's youth to choose from a
is to give the recipient a choice among available facilities, not to require the creation or authori-
zation of new facilities.") (internal citation omitted) (not addressing EPSDT). One unpublished
case from Connecticut did address a minor being sent out-of-state for services. See M.K. V.
Sergi, 554 F. Supp. .2d 175, 181 (D. Conn. 2008) (not addressing EPSDT). Here, the child's
mother had surrendered custody of her child with special needs in order for him to receive
treatment. Id at 188. The state placed child in out-of-state service program, the mother objected
to this placement, and she brought suit as next friend of her son. Id. at 181. The court denied
plaintiff's due process claim that, because of the out-of-state placement, the child "lost the
chance to develop a healthy relationship with his family," on the grounds that this did not impli-
cate a property interest. Id. at 187. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff had "not
produced any evidence that [the Connecticut Department of Children and Families] employed
"criteria or methods of administration" that had the purpose or effect of substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of its [intensive child behavioral health] program." Id at 199.
Specifically, although out-of-state placement may have hurt the child's relationship with his fam-
ily, the court held that the placement itself was not discriminatory because "the ADA [does not]
impose on the States a 'standard of care' for whatever medical services they render, or that the
ADA requires the States to 'provide a certain level of benefits to individuals with disabilities.' "
Id. at 198 (quoting Olmstead at 603 n.14) (internal quotations omitted). However, the court did
acknowledge that "'States must adhere to the ADA's nondiscrimination requirement with re-
gard to the services they in fact provide.' " Id. (quoting Olmstead at 603 n.14) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
104. See, e.g., W. Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1989)
aff'd, 499 U.S. 83, 111 S. Ct. 1138,113 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1991) (admonishing against "state budgetary
restraints (and] chauvinistic policies designed to curb access to" treatment) ("[A] state's reim-
bursement rates may not be so low as to compel the closing of a dangerous number of hospitals
or of a single medically important hospital, and thus compel medicaid recipients to travel an
unreasonable distance to obtain medical care. See H.R.Rep. No. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 294
(expressing concern that rates not be so low as to discourage hospitals from treating medicaid
patients)").
105. Id. at 23-24; See 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13)(A) (2006).
106. See supra Part I.D.1
107. See id
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trifecta of bad treatment options in lieu of the state paying for appro-
priate in-state services is neither reasonable nor adequate. 08
Nonetheless, the inherent limits on states' duties when providing
Medicaid services to adults only underscores the extent to which the
introduction of EPSDT upends the playing field. When courts are
presented with the question of whether EPSDT imposes a duty on
states to "provide intensive community-based mental health services
to youth with [mental illness] and their families that would enable the
youth to reside at home or in the community," a resounding chorus
has answered in the affirmative. 09
In Collins v. Hamilton, the Seventh Circuit held that a state violated
EPSDT in refusing to provide in-state PRTF services, even though
alternative inpatient services were available.'1 o Notably, the court fo-
cused not on whether other services might be able to replace a needed
EPSDT service, but rather whether a state failed to provide any par-
ticular EPSDT services."' Furthermore, Emily Q. v. Bonta held that
EPSDT requires the state to provide the "full scope" of mental health
services to children who, without those services, would otherwise be
locked in institutions.1 12 Here, at least, the Bonta ruling suggests that
replacing outmoded inpatient treatment with meaningful community-
based alternatives would nonetheless satisfy EPSDT provisions.
As for the extent to which EPSDT can require the creation of in-
state services, Kirk v. Houstoun held that Pennsylvania violated the
EPSDT provisions by failing to create, and promptly implement,
EPSDT services to qualifying children at the county-let alone
108. See generally supra notes 13-15 and corresponding text (regarding these youth's only
options being to (a) go without essential services; (b) go without essential services until they are
sick enough to warrant psychiatric hospitalization; or (c) seek treatment in another state).
109. DEP'r OF HEALTH AND) HUMAN SERVS., PunuIC FINANCING OF HOME AN]) COMMUNITY
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND YoUTHj Wfif SiuOUs EMoTIONAi DISTURBANCES: SELECIFED
STATE STRATEGIEs 14 (June 2006), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/youth
SED.pdf (citing Perkins, J., & Strickland, S., Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis & Treat-
ment Case Docket-Mental and Behavioral Health Services, National Health Law Program (July
2004) available at http://www.healthlaw.org/images/stories/epsdt/200407-EPSDT-mh-docket.pdf.
But cf Okla. Chapter of Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007)
("[EPSDT] requires a state Medicaid plan to pay for all such medical services, not, as plaintiffs
suggest, to directly provide them.").
110. Collins v. Hamilton, 349 F.3d 371, 373 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[State law provided that] resi-
dential placement in a PRTF is not covered, even if a child is diagnosed as needing such place-
ment by an EPSDT provider . .. By excluding all PRTFs, [the state] does not cover services
associated with residential placement, even if that placement occurs in a residential treatment
ward of a psychiatric hospital.").
111. See id.; see also Rosie D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2D 18, 53 (D. Mass. 2006) ("The fact
that Defendants provide some services does not relieve them of the duty to provide all necessary
services with reasonable promptness." (citation omitted)).
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state-level.'"3 Antrican v. Odom, a North Carolina case heard before
the Fourth Circuit, looked at the provision of in-state dental services,
and held that EPSDT requires states to not only provide, but create,
accessible EPSDT services throughout the state.'" 4 Here, the court
recognized the existence of in-state dentists who could provide
EPSDT services."' However, the plaintiff children often had to
,,116
"travel two hours each way to utilize [these EPSDT] services ....
On these facts alone, the Fourth Circuit denied the state's motion to
dismiss."' The mere existence of other in-state dentists was insuffi-
cient to plainly satisfy EPSDT requirements. Had the state argued
that-rather than actually ensure a sufficient supply of dental provid-
ers in North Carolina-it would be willing to pay to send the plaintiff
children to another state for appropriate dental care, it quite likely
would have been laughed out of court. And unlike intensive mental
health treatment, dental services do not even implicate the same is-
sues of community integration and social isolation.
Finally, in Rosie D. v. Romney, a district court in Massachusetts
held that a state's failure to provide adequate EPSDT services violates
EPSDT provisions and the "reasonable promptness" prong of the
Medicaid Act.' 18 Here, EPSDT qualified children demonstrated the
medical necessity of receiving particular services-some of them com-
munity-based-that did not currently exist in Massachusetts." 9 The
state had decided that the requested services were "experimental" and
therefore declined to provide them. However, in no uncertain terms,
the court emphasized the importance of EPSDT services and admon-
ished that "[the state] cannot . . . justify denying [Medicaid qualified]
children access to necessary treatment by citing barriers [it has] cho-
sen to erect in [its] own system of treatment." 120
The issue comes down to this: while the Medicaid statute generally
refers to "furnishing" services, EPSDT imposes a far greater duty on
113. See Kirk T. v. Houstoun, 2000 WL 830731, *1 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
114. See Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 182, 191 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied Odom v.
Antrican, 537 U.S. 973 (2002) ("[Tlhe Medicaid Act clearly mandates that a State provide a
certain level and quality of dental care."); see also Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852
(6th Cir.), cert denied, Haveman v. Westide Mothers 537 U.S. 1045 (2002) (on a similar claim);
cf Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 2003) (where the state was not obli-
gated to create services closer the home communities of adult Medicaid recipients).
115. Id.
116. Antrican, 290 F.3d at 182.
117. Id. at 191.
118. Rosie D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2d 18, 53 (D. Mass. 2006) ("Because Defendants have
failed to meet the substance of the EPSDT mandate, they have not satisfied Congress' command
to provide services with 'reasonable promptness.' "); see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2006); see also
Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F.Supp.2d 61, 79 (D. Mass. 2000).
119. Rosie D, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
120. Id. at 53 n.12.
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the state.12 1 It requires North Carolina to "make available a variety of
... qualified and willing" providers who can provide the "full pano-
ply" of EPSDT services to all Medicaid eligible youth under the age of
twenty-one.12 2 It also requires the state to pay for any and all medi-
cally necessary services for these youth regardless of cost.12 3 Here,
North Carolina has failed to meet these obligations under EPSDT.
With regard to complex/hard-to-serve children, there may be rare
instances when a particular child's condition is so unique and extreme
that only an out-of-state specialist can effectively treat him or her.
However, North Carolina policy clearly states that "[out-of-state]
placement will only be considered for youth who have: Co-occurring
disabilities, which may include but are not limited to medical
problems, that are so complex that only an [out-of-state] facility, with
specialty programming meets their needs . . . .""24 This cannot be gen-
eralized to every complex/hard-to-serve child. To analogize the medi-
cal field, a child suffering from a rare eye disorder might have to
travel across state lines in order to see the only specialist in the coun-
try who treats that condition. However, this exceptional circumstance
would not justify forcing all children with complex ocular disorders to
seek out-of-state providers. Similarly, there may be case-specific in-
stances of children needing highly-specialized treatment out-of-state
for exceedingly rare mental conditions. But this is entirely distinct
from accommodating the predictable spectrum of need for most com-
plex/hard-to-serve children. As such, North Carolina children who are
born with both mental illness and intellectual disabilities should not
be summarily sentenced out-of-state for treatment.
2. Medicaid's Comparability Provision
North Carolina has also violated Medicaid's comparability provi-
sion. This provision is fairly straightforward: "[t]he Medicaid Act re-
quires that comparable medical assistance be provided to individuals
with comparable needs."1 25 It "is violated when [certain Medicaid] re-
121. See 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(11) (2006).
122. See N.C. EPSDT Poiicy INSTRUCIlONS supra note 16, at 4.
123. Id. at 2 ("A child under [twenty-one] years of age financially eligible for Medicaid is
entitled to receive EPSDT services without any monetary cap provided the service meets all
EPSDT criteria . . . ."); see Rosie D., 410 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
124. N.C. COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION PROTOCOL, supra note 14, at 3 (emphasis added).
125. Pashby v. Cansler, 279 F.R.D. 347, 354 (2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)
(2006)); see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (2006) ("[M]edical assistance made available to any
[qualified] individual ... shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assis-
tance made available to any other such individual."). 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (2006) is im-
plemented through 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2012), which states as follows:
(b) Each [covered Medicaid] service must be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to
reasonably achieve its purpose.
2013] 87
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cipients are treated differently than others where each has the same
level of need." 12 6 For instance, in Pashby v. Cansler, the Fourth Cir-
cuit issued a preliminary injunction against North Carolina, where the
state restricted the eligibility criteria for certain services in personal
home settings, but not in adult care home settings, even though both
populations had similar needs.' 27 This scheme placed the people living
in their homes "at risk of segregation, in the form of [laws that favor
their] institutionalization . . . ."128 As a result, the court found that the
state violated Medicaid's comparability, and enjoined the state from
implementing the discrepant eligibility requirements.
North Carolina continues to violate Medicaid's comparability provi-
sion by failing to provide eighteen to twenty-one year olds with appro-
priate services in-state. The crux of this issue is a conflict between
state regulations, state policy, and EPSDT provisions. The state's
EPSDT policy documentation and service definitions regularly refer
to those who are EPSDT eligible (i.e. Medicaid eligible individuals
under twenty-one) as "child[ren]" and "adolescent[s]."1 29 However,
the section of the North Carolina Administrative Code that deals with
inpatient-level services defines the terms "children and adolescents"
as "minors from birth through [seventeen] years of age," not as any-
one under age twenty-one. 30 According to the state's regulations, "a
person [eighteen] years of age or older" is an "[a]dult.""'
(c) The Medicaid agency may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope
of a required service under §§440.210 and 440.220 to an otherwise eligible recipient solely
because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.
(d) The agency may place appropriate limits on a service based on such criteria as medical
necessity or on utilization control procedures.
42 C.F.R. § 440.230.
126. Pashby, 279 F.R.D. at 354 (quoting V.L. v. Wagner, 669 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1114-15
(N.D.Cal.2009)) (internal quotations omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 355.
129. See, e.g., N.C. EPSDT PouIcY INSTRUC-rIONS, supra note 16, at 2 ("A child under
[twenty-one] years of age financially eligible for Medicaid is entitled to receive EPSDT services
without any monetary cap provided the service meets all EPSDT criteria . . . ." (emphasis ad-
ded)); Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8A, supra note 57, at 34 ("Intensive In-Home (IIH) service
[is designed for] children and adolescents . . . through age 20." (emphasis added)); N.C. Div. of
Med. Assistance Enhanced Mental Health & Substance Abuse Serv., Clinical Coverage Policy
No.: 8D-2, supra note 57, at I ("[EPSDT] requires the state Medicaid agency to cover services,
products, or procedures for Medicaid beneficiaries under [twenty-one]years of age . . . . [tihis
means EPSDT covers most of the medical or remedial care a child needs . (emphasis
added)).
130. 10A N.C. AuMIN. Coin 27G.0103(10) (2012); see also 10A N.C. A)MIN. Coor
27G.0103(9) (2012) ("'Child' means a minor from birth through 12 years of age."); 10A N.C.
ADMIN. CoDE: 27G.0103(3) (2012) ("'Adolescent' means a minor from 13 through 17 years of
age.").
131. 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 27G.0103(4) (2012) (internal quotations omitted); cf. 10A
N.C. ADMIN. Com- 27G .0103(50) (2012) ("'School aged youth' means individuals from six
through twenty-one years of age," which appears to be more in line with EPSDT's child-to-adult
23
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As discussed earlier, Level II-IV facilities and PRTFs operate
under North Carolina's regulatory definition of "children and adoles-
cents," not Medicaid's, so these facilities are allowed to serve only
"children and adolescents" until they turn eighteen. As a result, this
incongruity between state and federal regulations creates an EPSDT
"doughnut-hole" for eighteen to twenty-one year olds who need in-
tensive mental health services.132 Although EPSDT entitles these
youth to receive any and all medically necessary services, there are no
inpatient facilities or comparable services in the entire state that can
treat them. More specifically, North Carolina has chosen to prohibit
providers from offering these services to eighteen to twenty-one year
olds.
As a result, Medicaid-eligible eighteen to twenty-one year olds who
might have comparable needs to sixteen or seventeen year olds cannot
obtain the same EPSDT services as sixteen and seventeen year olds.
This places eighteen to twenty-one year olds at a distinct disadvantage
from a treatment perspective. It ensures that all eighteen to twenty-
one year olds will be forced to (a) go without essential services; (b) go
without essential services until they are sick enough to warrant psychi-
atric hospitalization; or (c) seek treatment in another state.13 3 As such,
Medicaid eligible eighteen to twenty-one year olds who have compa-
rable needs to other EPSDT qualified recipients should be able to
receive a comparable "level and quality of . . . care" as their peers.134
However, the state prohibits them from doing so.
3. Medicaid's Out-of-State Placement Requirements
Finally, North Carolina violates Medicaid's out-of-state placement
requirements with regard to complex/hard-to-serve children and eigh-
teen to twenty-one year olds. In fact, it operates under a paradox.
Medicaid requires the state to "pay for services furnished [to a North
Carolina resident] in another state to the same extent that it would
pay for services furnished [to that resident] within its boundaries.""'
delineation age, although 10 N.C. ADMIN. Cooui 27G only uses this term in a developmental
delay education context).
132. See supra notes 64-69.
133. And Out-of-state placements generally are not in states with better Medicaid programs.
See ANNETTEr B. RAMfREZ DE ARiu ANO & SIDNEY M. WOLFF, UNSETLING SCORis A RANK-
ING OF STATE MEDICAID PROGRAMS (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
2007UnsettlingScores.pdf. In this study, North Carolina's Medicaid program ranked 24th. Id. at
19. States like Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Texas, where many North Caro-
lina youth are currently placed ranked 42nd, 40th, 22nd, 27th, and 45th, respectively. Id
134. Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 191 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied Odom v. Antrican 537
U.S. 973 (2002) (regarding a lack of Medicaid funded dental services.).
135. 42 C.F.R. § 431.52(b) (2013). However, this language is missing from North Carolina's
Medicaid billing guide. See BASIC MEDICAID ANiD NC HEALTH CHoci BILLING GuImE §7-2
(Apr. 2012) [hereinafter N.C. MEDICAID GunIE ("42 CFR §431.52(b)(1-4) (2013) only allows
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However, by shipping eighteen to twenty-one year olds and complex/
hard-to-serve children out of state for treatment, North Carolina is
paying for out-of-state services that it does not pay for in-state at all.
Furthermore, in order for the state to pay for out-of-state services, a
recipient's need for those services must arise from one of the
following:
(1) a medical emergency;
(2) a health-related inability for the resident to return to his state of
residence;
(3) "on the basis of medical advice" a needed treatment is "more
readily available" in another state; or
(4) it is "general practice for recipients in a particular locality to use
medical resources in another State."' 36
Generally, the out-of-state placements for complex/hard-to-serve
children and eighteen to twenty-one year olds requiring intensive
mental health services are not based on out-of-state medical emergen-
cies, nor do they result from out-of-state illnesses that prohibits them
from returning to North Carolina. To the contrary, the out-of-state
placements usually are imposed upon in-state youth who desperately
want to remain in-state, near their families and communities. To that
end, the first two predicate conditions for Medicaid's out-of-state
placement requirements are not relevant for the purposes of this Arti-
cle. However, the latter two at least warrant some analysis.
Under the third predicate condition, regarding out-of-state services
being "more readily available," there is a profound difference be-
tween the availability of services in one location and the complete
dearth of services in another.'3 Here, North Carolina's legal ban on
eighteen to twenty-one year olds from receiving certain essential in-
state services does not mean that treatment is more readily available
in other states "on the basis of medical advice." Rather, it is the result
of a direct failure by the state to provide any meaningful services for
this class of individuals. To the extent that "medical advice" indicates
that inpatient treatment is more "readily available" in other states,
such out-of-state treatment is not the result of better treatment op-
tions elsewhere, but rather a complete lack of any treatment options
in North Carolina.'3 Similarly, for complex/hard-to-serve children, by
creating a system that is ill designed to accommodate the predictable
states to pay for out-of-state services when furnished to a recipient who resides in North Caro-
lina and when any of the [four] conditions stated below are met.")
136. 42 C.F.R. § 431.52(b) (2013); see N.C. MDICAIo GUIDE, supra note 135, at §§ 7-2-7-3.
137. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.52(b)(3) ("[Payment for out-of-state treatment is permissible when]
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spectrum of complex/hard-to-serve children's needs, North Carolina is
ensuring that there will be a void of providers to address their needs.
Under the fourth predicate condition, a basic analysis of "particular
locality" underscores the fact that "particular locality" is not synony-
mous with "the entire state."'3 9 Rather, "particular locality" usually
applies to localized communities that receive Medicaid eligible treat-
ment in nearby, bordering states out of convenience. 140 North Caro-
lina's own Medicaid documentation recognizes this.'"' Just because
the state forces all eighteen to twenty-one year olds, and many com-
plex/hard-to-serve children, out of the state in order to receive non-
acute, intensive mental health services does not mean that youth from
a "particular locality" are voluntarily seeking out treatment in other
states. They are forced to do so from every locality in North Carolina.
Therefore, none of Medicaid's out-of-state placement requirements
are met. North Carolina either is violating Medicaid's out-of-state
payment requirements by funding services out-of-state that it refuses
to provide itself, or it is tacitly acknowledging that these services
should be available in-state. One possible counter to this analysis is
that states are only required to pay for out-of-state treatment to the
extent that certain services are furnished in-state and that voluntarily
paying for services beyond this does not violate 42 C.F.R. § 431.52(b).
However, accepting this line of reasoning would mean ignoring North
Carolina's proclamation that out-of-state placement is always a mea-
sure of last resort.142 The fact that EPSDT services are an entitlement,
further underscores the point.14 3
B. North Carolina's Violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act
Olmstead, discussed earlier, explicitly established the "community
integration" and "least restrictive treatment" mandates.14 4 Specifi-
cally, the United States Supreme Court noted that "[u]njustified isola-
tion . .. is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability."' 45
139. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.52(b)(4) ("[Payment for out-of-state treatment is permissible when
it is] general practice for recipients in a particular locality to use medical resources in another
State.").
140. See, e.g., W. Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1989) aff'd,
499 U.S. 83 (1991).
141. See N.C. MEICAID GujID, supra note 135, at §7-3 ("[Rjecipients who reside in North
Carolina but receive medically necessary care and services within 40 miles of the North Carolina
border in the contiguous states of Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia [fall under
the "particular locality" rule].").
142. N.C. COMPUIANCEi VERIFICATION PioTrocoL supra note 14, at 3.
143. NAMI, supra note 100.
144. See Olmstead v. L. C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 592, 599-600 (1999).
145. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil
Rights Div. to The Honorable Haley R. Barbour, Governor State of Miss., Re: United States'
2013] 91
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The Olmstead Court also indicated that, although the ADA does not
impose a "standard of care" on states for mental health services,
neither can states discriminate "with regard to the services they in fact
provide."1 4 6 Arguably, North Carolina has violated (1) Olmstead's
''community integration" and "least restrictive treatment" mandates
with regard to both complex/hard-to-serve children and eighteen to
twenty-one year olds and (2) Olmstead's non-discrimination require-
ment primarily with regard to complex/hard-to-serve children.
1. Olmstead's Community Integration and Least Restrictive
Mandates
North Carolina's current mental health treatment scheme for com-
plex/hard-to-serve children and eighteen to twenty-one year olds vio-
lates Olmstead's "community integration" and "least restrictive
treatment' mandates. 147 The state has continually failed to implement
meaningful community-based services for both children and those
over the age of eighteen.148 Furthermore, the state has created a legal
bar to eighteen to twenty-one year olds, and a de facto bar to com-
plex/hard-to-serve children, from seeking appropriate services in-
state. 149 This ensures that many complex/hard-to-serve children and
all eighteen to twenty-one year olds who require intensive mental
health services will be forced to (a) go without essential services; (b)
go without essential services until they are sick enough to warrant psy-
chiatric hospitalization; or (c) seek treatment in another state.
Forcing complex/hard-to-serve children and eighteen to twenty-one
year olds to go without essential services is certain to isolate them
from their communities and stigmatize them. It deprives complex/
hard-to-serve children and eighteen to twenty-one year olds of the
care they need to function as contributing members of society. Forcing
these youths to go without essential services until they are sick enough
to warrant psychiatric hospitalization further isolates them and carries
more risk of stigmatization.15 0 It also fosters a legal preference for
overly-restrictive institutionalization.15 ' Finally, forcing complex/hard-
to-serve children and eighteen to twenty-one year olds to seek treat-
ment in other states wholly excludes them from their communities,
Investigation of the State of Mississippi's Service System for Persons with Mental Illness and
Developmental Disabilities (Dec. 22, 2011) (quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597.)
146. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 n.14.
147. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 592, 599-600 (1999)
148. N.C. COMPLIANCI VERIFICATION PROTOCOL, supra note 14, at 2-3.
149. See supra Part 1.D.1
150. See generally Pashby v. Cansler, 279 F.R.D. 347, 355 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (admonishing
against schemes that create a legal preference for institutionalization).
151. Id.
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largely isolates them from their families,'5 2 and carries with it an even
bigger risk of stigmatization.'5 3  Not only does this hinder these
youths' ability to reintegrate back into their communities, but when
they are forced to seek treatment in other states-hundreds of miles
away from their homes-it is de facto more restrictive.
2. Olmstead's Non-Discrimination Requirement
In treating complex/hard-to-serve children, North Carolina violates
the Olmstead requirement that states cannot discriminate "with re-
gard to the services they in fact provide." 154 Unsurprisingly, complex/
hard-to-serve children can be, on average, more expensive to treat.
They are, by definition, complex and hard-to-serve. However, when
coupled with the state's bifurcation of children's intensive mental
health services ss-and the increasing number of lower-need children
being placed in more restrictive settings-providers are either unable
to, or otherwise plied with incentives not to, treat complex/hard-to-
serve children.15 6 Instead, many complex/hard-to-serve children find
themselves completely "excluded from participation in . . . services"
in-state solely "by reason of [their] disability[ies].""
Some courts have held expressly that "the severity of [a person's]
handicaps is itself a handicap."' Under this interpretation, where a
state's service system discriminates against a particular class due to
the severity of their respective disabilities, it is discriminating against
them on the basis of a disability. By constructing a mental health sys-
tem that funnels the sickest children out of that system, North Caro-
152. As a general rule, families cannot afford to fly across the county on a regular basis. By
definition, many Medicaid eligible children come from low-income households. Moreover, even
high-functioning, mentally healthy @eighteen year olds can have difficulty transitioning when
they leave their home state for the first time-for instance, when going to college. Expecting an
eighteen year old-let alone a child-who is in crisis and has significant psychological and emo-
tional issues to get shipped off as far away as Texas for treatment and to then seamlessly reinte-
grate into his or her community upon discharge is nonsensical.
Family dynamics also can be an aggravating factor that contributes to an individual needing
intensive mental health services in the first place. Providing families and youths with adequate
training to resolve those issues can be challenging on its own. It becomes almost impossible with
a geographic divide between parties. Out-of-state placement also limits the availability of certain
evidence-based practices, such as "parent-child interaction therapy," which require parents and
children to be in the same room. See U.S. SCIE7NCF TO SERvIcE RFPORT, supra note 49, at 41.
153. The fact that this isolation occurs during crucial developmental years also has the poten-
tial of dire long-term consequences.
154. Olmstead v. L. C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 603 n.14 (1999).
155. See supra notes 73-75 and corresponding text.
156. See supra note 76.
157. Contra 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
158. Plumber v. Brandstad, 731 F.2D 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1984).
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lina is discriminating against complex/hard-to-serve children.'5 9 This
practice violates Olmstead's non-discrimination requirement.
C. North Carolina's Violation of Its Own Mental Health Policies
Although not "evidence-based," North Carolina's "best practice"
service model has praiseworthy policy behind it. North Carolina rec-
ognizes the following:
[Tihe practice of discrimination based upon a disabling condition is
contrary to the public interest and to the principles of freedom and
equality of opportunity; the practice of discrimination on the basis of a
disabling condition threatens the rights and proper privileges of the
inhabitants of this state; and such discrimination results in a failure to
realize the productive capacity of individuals to their fullest extent. 160
The state also recognizes that "[f]or [mental health] system reform
to be comprehensive and enduring, it must be based on values and
principles that reflect the consensus of stakeholders in the system, as
well as national perspectives and scientific findings" that are based on
six principals that treatment be (1) "[p]articipant-driven;" (2)
"[c]ommunity based;" (3) "[p]revention focused;" (4) "[r]ecovery out-
come oriented;" (5) "[r]eflect best treatment/support practices;" and
(6) "[cjost effective. "161
The state publicly endorses "person centered planning" which "fo-
cuses on the identification of the individual's/family's needs and de-
sired life outcomes." 1 6 2 The state also requires that "[f]amily members
or other legally responsible persons shall be involved in the develop-
159. This paper largely argues that the treatment needs of eighteen to twenty-one year olds
are generally not so distinct from their slightly younger peers as to render them "untreatable"
within the state. See supra Part II.A.1. However, to the extent that certain eighteen to twenty-
one year olds could be more difficult to treat, they may not be covered by Medicaid Comparabil-
ity Provision in this regard).
160. Persons with Disabilities Protection Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §168A-2(b) (2011).
161. NC Dip'r HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., TRANSFORMATION oF NORTH CAROLINA'S
SYSTEM OF SERVICES FOR MENTAL HEALIl, DEvELOPMENTAL DISABILITIEs AND SUBSTANCE
AnusE, THE STATE STRATEGIC PLAN: 2007-2010 5-6 (2007) [hereinafter N.C. STATE STRATE-
GIG PLAN], available at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/mhddsas/statspublications/annualrptsstrategic-
plans/StrategicplanO7-10/strategicplanO7-10finalweb-06-29-07.pdf.
162. Div. MENTAL HEALTH, DEv. DISABILITIES AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERV.,PERSON-
CENTERED PLANNING MANUAL 5 (2010) [hereinafter N.C. PERSON-CENTERED PLANNING MAN-
UAL], available at http://www.ncdhhs.gov/mhddsas/statspublications/Manuals/pcp-instruction
manual2-3-10.pdf ("The Person-Centered Plan (PCP) is the umbrella under which all planning
for treatment, services and supports occurs. . . . It focuses on the identification of the individ-
ual's/family's needs and desired life outcomes. It is not just a request for a specific service(s) ....
Natural and community supports should always be considered within all person-centered
plans.")
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ment and implementation of treatment plans in order to assure a
smooth transition to . . . less restrictive setting[s]."1 63
In the application process, prospective PRTFs must agree to "par-
ticipate in the North Carolina Medicaid Program" and each provider
"certifies and agrees" to make "PRTF services . . . available to recipi-
ents under [twenty-one] years of age."'" State policy explicitly recog-
nizes that PRTF level treatment is supposed to be utilized by youth
165 fedrathrough the age of twenty-one, as do federal regulations.' 66 With
regard to treatment, generally, "[u]nder EPSDT, North Carolina
Medicaid must make available a variety of individual and group prov-
iders qualified and willing to provide EPSDT services," and
"[r]ecipients under [twenty-one] must be afforded access to the full
panoply of EPSDT services ... ."167
The North Carolina Compact on Mental Health, which allows for
out-of-state placement for North Carolinians requiring mental health
treatment, provides that the purpose of such an interstate compact is
to "benefit . . . patients, their families, and society as a whole," citing
"humanitarian[ ]" reasons.168 The compact strongly emphasizes that
out-of-state treatment is appropriate only when "the care and treat-
ment of [a] patient would be facilitated or improved" by seeking treat-
ment out-of-state, and only when it would be "in the best interest of
163. 10A N.C.A.C. 27G §§ .1303(b), .1706(b), .1805(b), .1903(e) (2012) (applying to Level
II, Level III & IV, Psychiatric Hospital, and PRTF treatment facilities, respectively) (emphasis
added).
164. NC DEP'T HEALTII ANi) HUMAN SERV.,NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF MEDICAL AS-
SISTANCE MEDICAID PARICIwATION AGRrEEMENT, NORTIl CAROLINA DEPARTMENr OF
HEALTIi AN) HUMAN SERVICES PRTF ENROLLMENT PACKET 11, 13 (2009) available at http://
qa.dhhs.state.nc.us/dmalprovenroll/residentialprtfenroll.pdf.
165. In fact, the state's own clinical coverage policy that specifically covers PRTF treatment
is titled "Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facilities for Children Under the Age of [twenty-
one]." See Clinical Coverage Policy No.: 8D-1, supra note 3. The comingling of PRTF treatment
and a twenty-one year old age cap is endemic to other PRTF related documentation. See, e.g.,
NORTH CAROLINA DiPARTMENT OF HEALTH ANi) HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION OF MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE CLINICAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS, DMA CERTIwICATION OF NEFE) FOR MEDICAID
INPATIENT PSYCIIATRIC SERVICES IN A PSYCHIATRIC RISIDENTIAL. TREATMENT FACILITY
(PRTF) FOR A RI-cImNT UNDER Ti AGE- OF 21, available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/
123910472/PRTF-CON (in title of form); July 2012 Medicaid Bulletin, NC DHHS, http://www.
ncdhhs.gov/dma/bulletin/0712bulletin.htm ("Federal regulations require a [certain] form to be
completed for admissions of Medicaid recipients under the age of 21 to a psychiatric hospital or
PRTF.").
166. See Inpatient Psychiatric Services for Individuals Under Age 21 in Psychiatric Facilities
or Programs, 42 C.F.R. § 441.151(a) (2013); see also Medicaid Program, Use of Restraint and
Seclusion in Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facilities Providing Psychiatric Services to Indi-
viduals Under Age 21, 66 Fed. Reg. 28110 (May 22, 2001); Letter from Center for Medicaid and
State Operations/Survey and Certification Group to State Survey Agency Directors, Psychiatric
Residential Treatment Facilities (PRTF) Clarification (Feb. 16, 2007).
167. N.C. EPSDT Pou cy INSTRUCIlONS, supra note 16, at 4 (emphasis added).
168. Interstate Compact on Mental Health, N.C. GEN. STAr. § 122C-361, Art. I. (2011).
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the patient."1 69 It also requires that North Carolina keep tabs on the
youth it sends to other states for treatment.170
Even more boldly, North Carolina's out-of-state placement policy
for youth proclaims that "[i]n-state placement for the support and
continuity of family involvement is the first priority, with [out-of-
state] placements as the last option.""'7  Specifically, "[out-of-state]
placement will only be considered for youth who have: Co-occurring
disabilities, which may include but are not limited to medical
problems, that are so complex that only an [out-of-state] facility, with
specialty programming meets their needs. . . ."172 "No exceptions are
allowed."' 73
North Carolina has failed to live up to its own stated policies. Forc-
ing North Carolina's youth to forego services or seek treatment in
other states as a first line of treatment "is contrary to the public inter-
est and to the principles of freedom and equality of opportunity."17 4
The current system does not "reflect the consensus of stakeholders in
the system . . . and scientific findings." 75  It is not "[p]articipant-
driven;" "[clommunity based;" "[p]revention focused;" "[riecovery
outcome oriented;" or "[c]ost effective."1 76 It does not respect "the
individual's/family's needs and desired life outcomes."' 7 7 It does not
ensure that Medicaid "[r]ecipients under [twenty-one are] afforded
access to the full panoply of EPSDT services," nor does it ensure
these youths' "right to a free choice of providers. "178
169. § 122C-361, Art. III §§ (b), (e) (2011) (emphasis added).
170. § 122C-361, Art. X (2011) ("Each party state shall appoint a 'Compact Administrator'
who, on behalf of his state, shall act as general coordinator of activities under the Compact in his
state and who shall receive copies of all reports, correspondence, and other documents relating
to any patient processed under the Compact . . . ."); N.C. GEN. STAT. §71-3806 (2011) (The
Governor is hereby authorized to appoint [the] Compact Administrator . . . ."); see generally
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children N.C. GIN. STAT.§§ 7B-3800-3806 (2011).
North Carolina has divided the Compact Administrator duties between multiple individuals who
are in charge of multiple counties. See NC Diie'r HEALTH AND) HUMAN SEitv., Interstate Serv.
ICPC Cnty. Assignment 2011, available at http://icpc.aphsa.org/home/doc/NC DHHS.pdf.
171. N.C.COMrLIANCE VERIWICATION PROTOCOL, supra note 14, at 3.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 4.
174. Persons With Disabilities Protection, Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-2(b) (2011).
175. Contra N.C. STATE STRATEGIC PLAN, supra notel61, at 5.
176. Contra id.
177. Contra N.C. PERSON-CENTERED PLANNING MANUAL supra note 162, at 5 (explaining
"The Person-Centered Plan (PCP) is the umbrella under which all planning for treatment, ser-
vices and supports occurs. . . . It focuses on the identification of the individual's/family's needs
and desired life outcomes. It is not just a request for a specific service(s). . . . Natural and com-
munity supports should always be considered within all person-centered plans.").
178. Contra N.C. EPSDT PoIcy INSTRUCIONs supra note 16, at 4; Clinical Coverage Policy
No.: 8D-2, supra note 57, at 1 ("Medically necessary services will be provided in the most eco-
nomic mode, as long as the treatment made available is similarly efficacious to the service re-
quested by the beneficiary's physician . . . and the determination does not limit the beneficiary's
right to a free choice of providers.")
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With regard to forced out-of-state placements, specifically, North
Carolina's mental health system fails to "benefit . . . patients, their
families, and society as a whole."1 7 It certainly is not based on "hu-
manitarian[ ]" principles. 8 Very often, out-of-state placements are
not made because "the care and treatment of [a] patient would be
facilitated and improved" by out-of-state treatment, and thus would
be "in the best interest of the patient.""' Instead, these placements
often happen because families have no other option. Furthermore,
once youth are placed out-of-state, the geographical divide between
youth and their families can block family members from involvement
"in the development and implementation of treatment plans," which
is a right which they are guaranteed under the law.'8 2 This does not
ensure the "continuity of family involvement [as] the first priority.""'
More to the point, it does not treat out-of-state placements "as the last
option."' 8 4
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR MEANINGFUL REFORM
A. North Carolina Should Implement the Reforms that it Promised
Over a Decade Ago
The failure of North Carolina's mental health reform effort is most
vividly defined by its lost promises and missed opportunities. As more
youths slip through the cracks of North Carolina's fractured mental
health system, the contrast between where we are today and where we
could be is thrown into starker and starker relief. For years, North
Carolina's Science to Service Blueprint and SAMHSA's evidence-
based practice implementation toolkits have been readily available for
lawmakers to use when crafting their so-called reforms.'8 5 And yet,
these vital resources remain unutilized.
Were North Carolina to actually implement the meaningful reforms
that it promised over a decade ago by adopting an evidence-based
179. Contra Interstate Compact on Mental Health, N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 122C-361, Art. I
(2011).
180. Contra Id.
181. Contra N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-361 (b), (e).
182. 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 27G §§ .1303(b), .1706(b), .1805(b), .1903(e) (2012) (applying
to Level II, Level III & IV, Psychiatric Hospital, and PRTF treatment facilities, respectively)
("Family members or other legally responsible persons shall be involved in the development and
implementation of treatment plans in order to assure a smooth transition to . . . less restrictive
setting[s]." (emphasis added)).
183. Contra N.C. CoMLIANCE VERIFICATION PROTOCOL, supra note 14, at 3 (proclaiming
that "all appropriate in-state [treatment] options [must be] exhausted prior to requesting out-of-
state placement[ ]," for any of North Carolina's children with mental illness and that "[i]n-state
placement for the support and continuity of family involvement is the first priority, with [out-of-
state] placements as the last option").
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 51-55 and corresponding text.
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practice model for all of its mental health services, North Carolina
would ensure that every tax-payer dollar that went to providing
mental health services for its citizens would go to treatments that were
actually proven to work.'8 6 This would provide an obvious benefit for
the North Carolinians who are receiving mental health services and
their families. It also would benefit the state by (1) reducing wasteful
spending on ineffectual services, (2) streamlining the processes for
creating new and even more effective services in the future,"' and (3)
alleviating the burden on police departments, social service depart-
ments, and other service entities that invariably are strained when the
state's mental health system fails.1 88 The status-quo is no longer tena-
ble. North Carolina keeping its promise of meaningful mental health
reform is no longer just the right thing to do-it is the prudent thing
to do.
B. North Carolina Should Build on the Success of Other States
Fortunately, North Carolina would not be alone in implementing an
evidence-based system of care. Numerous states have already begun
utilizing evidence-based practices in their mental health service sys-
186. Or at least that showed the promise of being supported by empirical research. Cur-
rently, the state essentially bans the creation of emerging practices, by instituting a blanket pro-
hibition on "experimental/investigational" services under EPSDT, even though emerging
practices are distinct from other "experimental/investigational" services that might be based on
pseudo-science or that just don't work. See supra note 100; see generally supra note 62; infra note
206 and corresponding text.
187. Id.
188. See Corey Friedman, Mentally Ill Pose Challenge to Police, WILSON TIMES (Apr. 17,
2013, 11:46 PM), http://www.wilsontimes.com/News/Feature/Story/20003678--MENTAL-
HEALTH--THE-LAW ("State and federal funding cuts have hobbled mental health services,
[said Janelle Clevinger, executive director of the Mental Health Association in Wilson County],
and patients left untreated are more prone to aggressive and violent behavior. 'Several years
ago, the state of North Carolina decided to put the burden of mental health care back on com-
munities,' she said. 'Psychiatric hospitals were closed, leaving these people with nowhere to go.'
The result is more work for police and sheriff's deputies who have to drive patients hundreds of
miles to be committed to a long-term care facility and who may have to confront an armed
mentally ill person in the community. 'The legal system has been bearing the brunt of this, I
think, for the last several years,' Clevinger said. 'Right now, the taxpayers are paying for highly
trained officers to work as taxis and babysitters.' When a magistrate judge signs an involuntary
commitment order, the law enforcement officers tasked with serving it have to escort the com-
mitted person to the hospital emergency room for psychological evaluations.); E. Fuller Torry,
How to Bring Sanity to Our Mental Health System, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/12/how-to-bring-sanity-to-our-mental-health-sys-
tem# ftnl7 ("Just as jails and prisons have become America's new psychiatric inpatient system,
so too have the police, sheriffs, and courts become the nation's psychiatric outpatient system.
Police and sheriffs are now the first responders for most mental illness crisis calls in the commu-
nity. Many such calls are to transport mentally ill persons to hospitals. . . . In North Carolina in
2010, sheriffs' departments 'reported more than 32,000 trips last year to transport psychiatric
patients for involuntary commitments.' " (citing Ruth Sheehan, Shuttling Patients Burdens Depu-
ties, News & Observer, Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/01/15/
285369/shuttling-patients-burdens-deputies.html).
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tems.'89 Beginning in 2002, eight states implemented the National Evi-
dence-Based Practices Project, which aimed to put in place evidence-
based mental health practices across the country.1 90 Underpinning this
effort was a recognition that leaving "the details and content of
clinical practice to providers" alone would not facilitate effective
change.19' Instead, implementing evidence-based practices requires
mental health authorities at the state-level to "explicitly and exten-
sively focus on both the organization and financing of care and the
content and quality of direct clinical care simultaneously." 192 Not only
did the services need to change, but the systemic infrastructure that
supported those services had to change as well.
Of the states that participated in the National Evidence-Based Prac-
tices Project, Kansas, in particular, has had great success in imple-
menting evidence-based practices using this approach. First, Kansas
made sure that the state's mental health authorities were invested in
the implementation of evidence-based practices.' 93 Lip-service to the
notion of reform was not enough. This alone had a profound effect on
the success of the reform effort.194 Then, as the implementation and
data collection/dissemination process was underway, state grants al-
lowed the University of Kansas to "hire consultant trainers and
monitors to support [evidence-based practice] implementation" as
part of its ongoing "responsib[ility] for monitoring [treatment] fidelity
and outcomes." 9 s Not only did implementing evidence-based prac-
tices require the collection of treatment data, it required active moni-
toring of that data to ensure compliance with service guidelines. The
state and University of Kansas performed regular and frequent "Fi-
189. See Moiny FINNERTY ET AL., STATE HEAIrni AunloRIry YARDSTICK (SHAY): IM-
PAM O STATE LEVi ACrION ON TlE QUAirrY AND PENETRATION oiF EBPs IN TIom COMMu-
Nrry 7 (2005) (discussing the implementation of evidence-based practices in Indiana, Kansas,
Ohio, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, Washington, and Maryland); National Association
of State Mental Health Program Directors Research Institute, Implementing Evidence Based
Practices Project National Review of Effective Implementation Strategies and Challenges (Apr.
7 & 8, 2003) (meeting notes), available at http://www.nriinc.org/reports pubs/2003/EBPNat-
IReviewlmplementationMtg2003.pdf (also discussing the implementation of evidence-based
practices in Oregon and in the United States Department of Veterans Affairs).
190. See generally Doug Marty et al., Factors Influencing Consumer Outcome Monitoring in
Implementation of Evidence-Based Practices: Results from the National EBP Implementation
Project, 35 Journal of Administration and Policy in Mental Health 204 (2008); Charles A. Rapp
et al., Evidence-Based Practice Implementation in Kansas, 46 COMMUNITY MiENT. HEALTI J. 461,
461 (2010).
191. Kimberley Roussin Isett et al., The Role of State Mental Health Authorities in Managing
Change for the Implementation of Evidence-Based Practices, 44 COMMUNIrY MiENT HEAlICFI J.
195, 208 (2008).
192. Id.
193. Rapp et al., supra note 190, at 462.
194. Isett et al., supra note 191, at 209.
195. Rapp et al., supra note 190, at 462 ("Fidelity" is a measure of how in compliance a given
provider is with the guidelines of a particular evidence-based service).
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delity and Outcomes" reviews to ensure that treatment was, in fact,
data-driven and that outcomes were successful.' 9 6
Beyond these global changes, Kansas also engaged with providers
and encouraged them to embrace evidence-based methodologies.' 9 7
The state utilized basic economic incentives, rewarding providers with
higher reimbursement rates when they could demonstrate, through
objective data, that they had achieved "high-fidelity" with evidence-
based methodologies. 9" Kansas implemented local "Leadership
Teams" that expeditiously addressed local barriers to treatment fidel-
ity with evidence-based methodologies.' 99 Staff at all levels received
training on evidence-based practices, sometimes even in the field.2 00
Kansas recognized that simply relying on "workshop training" would
not suffice.2 0'
In short, it was a group effort. But it had to be. "The movement to
implement [evidence-based practices] is complex and often requires
changes in the state['s] infrastructure of policy and financing, the or-
ganization level of provider agencies, and the practice methods used
by practitioners." 202 The goal could not "only [be for] the implementa-
tion of . . . evidence based practice[s], but also to help sustain [them]
over time." 20 3
Today, Kansas continues to implement evidence-based practices in-
state successfully. 204 It also utilizes evidence-based methodologies to
design novel and innovative services. 205 These "emerging practices"
show promise, and may even be supported by data, just not enough to
earn the label of "evidence-based." 2 1 But because the state's data col-
lection/dissemination infrastructure already exists, Kansas is able to
196. Id. at 463. .
197. Id. at 462.
198. "High-fidelity" means that a provider's actual practices strongly match a given evi-
dence-based services' guidelines.
199. Rapp et al. supra note 190, at 462.
200. Id. at 463-4.
201. Id. at 465.
202. Id. at 464.
203. Id. at 465.
204. Id. at 461.
205. Id. One of those practices, Integrated Dual Diagnosis Treatment, is specifically geared
towards treating individuals with dual-diagnoses and was recently approved as an evidence-
based practice in Kansas. See Integrated Dual Diagnosis Treatment (IDDT), U. KAN. ScI L Soc.
WaI-mI, http://mentalhealth.socwel.ku.eduloverview-iddt (last visited Nov. 28, 2013). Cur-
rently, Kansas is developing other evidence-based practices, such as, Supported Education, Sup-
ported Housing, Pathways to Recovery, Wellness Recovery Action Plan (WRAP), Consumers as
Providers (CAP), and Common Ground/Decision Support Center. Id.
206. Emerging Practices, U. KAN. SCI. Soc. WELFARE, https://web.archive.org/web/20110216
015820/http://www.socwel.ku.edu/mentalhealth/projects/Emerging/index.shtmI (last visited Nov.
28, 2013) (accessed by searching http://www.socwel.ku.edu/mentalhealth/projects/Emerging/in-
dex.shtml in the Internet Archive index) ("[An emerging practice] differs from a true evidence-
based practice in that it has less than five published scientifically rigorous studies using consis-
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test these novel services in real time. This approach to developing new
and effective services has the potential to compound and eventually
allow the state to develop a full continuum of evidence-based services
across the entire spectrum of its citizens' mental health needs.
C. North Carolina Should Fix What it Has Broken
Of course, were North Carolina to follow Kansas' lead and imple-
ment evidence-based services, this would not entirely fix the damage
to the North Carolina's mental health system. As an example, for
eighteen to twenty-one year olds and complex/hard-to-serve children,
the promise of evidence-based services in North Carolina means very
little if they still are summarily denied access in-state services. As
such, North Carolina should amend its regulations and implement
new reforms to ensure that intensive in-state mental health services
are available to these youth. To be clear, this paper does not advocate
for expanding the scope of already existing services, such as PRTFs, to
fill the service gaps faced by these populations. Instead, the well-de-
fined service gaps that eighteen to twenty-one year olds and complex/
hard-to-serve children currently face are fertile ground for beginning
to implement evidence-based practices in the state. Meaningful, sys-
temic reform has to start somewhere, and these are two groups that
particularly could use some positive change.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina's children are growing up; the system that oversees
their care is broken. The state has constructed systemic barriers to
youth and their families, preventing them from obtaining vital, life-
affirming services in-state. Not only do these barriers violate federal
law, they undermine North Carolina's fundamental values and harm
its credibility. Where the realities of mental health services in North
Carolina do not match the state's own lofty statements of policy, its
youth and their families find themselves adrift at the disconnect.
North Carolina must stop wasting money on ad hoc and piecemeal
reform efforts. As of 2008, "[t]he state [had already] wasted at least
$400 million in . . . ill-conceived and poorly executed" reforms.2 07
How much additional money has been wasted in the five years subse-
quent? North Carolina can start counting at $287 million.20 8 Rather
tent dependent variables. Emerging practices, like evidence-based practices, are highly specified
interventions that have been manualized.").
207. Pat Smith & David Raynor, Reform Wastes Millions, Enriches Providers, Fails to Serve
Mentally Ill, NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 24, 2008, at 1A, available at http://www.media2.newsob-
server.com/static/content/pdf.
208. See supra note 43 (regarding the ongoing adult care home settlement).
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than spend more and more taxpayer money on shipping youth to
other states, that money could be used right here in North Carolina to
provide better services. Community-based treatment is at least cost-
neutral, and in some cases may cost a fraction of PRTF, or compara-
ble inpatient, treatment. 209 More importantly, these services are effec-
tive. 210 By combining a meaningful community-based treatment
model with the proven efficacy of evidence-based practices, the state
209. See OswALoo URDAPILLETA IT AL, NATIONAL EVALUATION OF TIIF MEDICAID DEM-
ONSTRATION Homun- AND COMMUNrry-BAsIAo ALTERNATIVES TO PSYCHIATRIC RESIDENTIAL
TREATMENT FACILITIES XiV (Nov. 1, 2011) ("The fact that the Demonstration has easily met cost
neutrality tests and on average has consistently maintained or improved functional status for all
children and youth is a success story."); U.S. DEPARTMENT oF HEAL TIr AND HUMAN SERVICES,
OFFICE OF THE AssISTANT SECRETI'ARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, Puniic FINANCING
OF HOME AND COMMUNIy SERVICEs FOR CIllLDREN AND YOUTH WITH SERIous EMonONAL
DIsTURBANCEs: SIuLEeo STATE STRATEGIES 9, Table 11.1 (June 2006), available at http://www.
mathematica-mpr.com/publications/PDFs/pubfinhome.pdf; S 3289: Children's Mental Health Ac-
cessibility Act, FAMILIES LIKE OuRs (Sept. 19, 2012, 3:03 PM), https://www.familieslikeours.org/
blog/201209/s-3289-children's-mental-health-accessibility-act ("[l]ntensive in-home and commu-
nity-based services costs are on average less than a third of the cost of PRTF institutional
costs."); see also Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-171); US DHHS, Public Financ-
ing of Home and Community Services for Children and Youth with Serious Emotional Distur-
bances: Selected State Strategies (June 2006) (noting that "the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act
(Public Law 109-171) authorizesdemonstration projects for up to ten states to assess the effec-
tiveness of home and community-based alternatives to psychiatric residential treatment facilities
(PRTFs)") A study was conducted under the authority of the Debt Reduction Act of 2005. See
generally KATHLEEN SEnIIuUS, SECRIEITARY oF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvicEs, REPORT TO
TilE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS MEDICAID HOME AND) COMMIUNITY-BASEI) Ai TERNATIVES TO
PsycIIATRIC RESIDENrIAL TREATMENT FACILITIES DEMONSTRATION (July 2013), available at
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Delivery-Systems/In-
stitutional-Care/Downloads/PRTF-Demo-Report-.pdf. It specifically was designed to "to test
whether children and youth who meet the requirements to be served in a psychiatric residential
treatment facility (PRTF) could successfully and cost effectively be served in the community."
Id. at 1. Nine states participated. Id. at 2 (Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missis-
sippi, Montana, South Carolina, and Virginia). And the results were astounding:
For all nine states over the first three Demonstration years for which cost data was available to
be collected, there was an average savings of 68 percent. In other words, the waiver services cost
only 32 percent of comparable services provided in PRTFs. The Demonstration proved cost
effective and consistently maintained or improved functional status on average for all enrolled
children and youth.
Id. at 3.
210. See supra note 209. And beyond general efficacy, the United States Department of
Health and Human Services recognizes the inherent value of community-based services:
These children and adolescents have claimed a great deal of attention because of the gap
between their need for intensive treatment and the availability of appropriate home and
community services, which include a range of nontraditional treatments from home-based
family counseling, respite care, and family-to-family support to independent skills training,
crisis intervention, and treatment foster care. More and more studies indicate that these
services are effective not only in improving mental health outcomes for youth with SED, but
also in reducing or preventing stays in residential care and other out-of-home settings.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEATI I AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF [HE AssISTANT SECRETARY
FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC FINANCING OF HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES
FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTHI WITii SERIOUs EMoTIONAL DISTURBANCES: SELECTED STATE
STRATEGIES vii (June 2006), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/PDFs/
pubfinhome.pdf.
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can ensure that North Carolina tax dollars will be spent only on the
most efficient and efficacious services. The toolkits to implement evi-
dence-based practices, in step-by-step fashion, already exist. Not only
have they also been proven to work, they are free and readily
available.2 1 1
While much change is needed for North Carolina's mental health
system, simply complying with federal law and living up to its own
policies will bring North Carolina exponentially closer to providing its
youth with the services-and dignity-that they deserve. The mis-
takes of the past decade need not doom the state in the next. But
hoping that meaningful reform will somehow magically appear is not
an effective strategy. The time to act is now. North Carolina's youth
and their families cannot wait any longer.
211. See supra notes 51-55 and corresponding text.
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